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Abstract 
 This piece, which is in three parts, will revisit the importation of fairness 
into the employment contract (outside and independent of the fairness-
based provisions of our labour legislation) by a line of Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) judgments during the 2000s. This process culminated in 
the recognition of an "implied duty of fair dealing" in the common-law 
employment contract. This piece will discuss such developments, will 
argue that such an implied duty still forms part of our law (despite the 
apparent consensus in the literature that the SCA turned its back on such 
earlier judgments), will critically examine some of the arguments for and 
against the recognition of such a duty, and will then consider the issue 
within the broader context of the role of good faith and fairness in our 
general law of contract. 
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1 Introduction  
Part 1 of this piece examined the line of cases before the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) in the period between 2003 and 2010 which involved 
constitutional development of the common-law employment contract in order 
to import notions of fairness into the employment relationship. The high point 
of such development came in the judgment of Cameron JA in Murray v 
Minister of Defence,1 with the express recognition of an implied duty of fair 
dealing between employers and employees. In Part 2 of this piece I examined 
the SCA's purported backtracking on such development of the common law 
by Wallis AJA in SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie,2 and I argued that 
McKenzie has in fact not resulted in a wholesale rejection of the duty of fair 
dealing, as is commonly supposed to be the case. 
In this final part, Part 3, I will examine some of the main arguments for and 
against the continued recognition of such an implied duty of fair dealing as a 
mechanism which may run parallel to the scheme of fairness contained in the 
labour legislation in order to ensure the optimum pursuit of the constitutional 
guarantee of fair labour practices as contained in section 23 of the Bill of 
Rights. In this part, I will consider the following: 
- whether the labour legislation sufficiently gives effect to the right to fair 
labour practices in all cases; 
- the argument that recourse to common-law remedies in cases of 
dismissal, especially, is inappropriate, on the grounds that an unlawful 
dismissal (a breach of the employment contract) would automatically be 
an unfair dismissal, and would necessitate a claimant to bring its case 
under the unfair dismissal provisions of the Labour Relations Act; 
- the argument that the recognition of common-law remedies for 
(especially) dismissal circumvents the legislative dispute resolution 
scheme and amounts to the judiciary's usurping the role of the 
                                            
*  Van Staden and Smit 2010 TSAR 712. 
**  Andre M Louw. BA LLB LLM LLD (Stellenbosch). Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, 
Stellenbosch University. Email: alouw@sun.ac.za. I wish to express my sincere 
thanks to my colleague, Christoph Garbers, for his very helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this piece. Also see Louw 2018(21) PER / PELJ Parts 1 & 2. 
1  Murray v Minister of Defence 2009 3 SA 130 SCA (hereafter the Murray case). 
2  SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA) (hereafter the 
McKenzie case). 
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legislature (and in the process ignoring or negating the policy 
considerations behind the legislative scheme); 
- the argument against the recognition and utilisation of common-law 
remedies because such recognition would allow employees to "double-
dip" in the labour fora and the civil courts; and  
- the fact that the duty of fair dealing should provide protection to 
employees and employers alike. 
Thereafter, in section 3 below I will consider the relevance of developments 
regarding the role of good faith and substantive fairness in the broader 
context of the general law of contract. In section 4 below I will summarise the 
discussion and arguments contained in parts 1-3 of this piece, and conclude.  
2 The main arguments for (and against) the recognition of 
the common-law duty of fair dealing 
Courts have increasingly moved away from the traditional notion that the 
availability of protection to employees in terms of the labour legislation 
depends on the existence of a (valid) contract of employment. In the light of 
the broad definition of "employee" in the legislation, the focus has shifted to 
the presence of an employment relationship.3 This development was also 
echoed in the latest round of amendments to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 (LRA).4 The legislative protection mechanisms (such as, primarily, the 
prohibition on unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals) are there in order 
to give effect to the right to fair labour practices in the Bill of Rights. And the 
courts have given a broad interpretation to the application of this right to 
"everyone", including those persons not in a contractual relationship.5  
In the light of this lesser emphasis on the existence of a contract and the 
broad approach to the application of the constitutional right to fair labour 
                                            
3  Discovery Health v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 2008 7 
BLLR 633 (LC); Kylie v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 2010 7 
BLLR 705 (LAC) (hereafter the Kylie case). 
4  See, for instance, the deletion of the words "a contract of" in s 186(1)(a) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) ("'Dismissal' means that an employer has 
terminated employment with or without notice") as effected by the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act 6 of 2014. 
5  See the Kylie case para 21, with reference to South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence 1999 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) paras 28-30: "Even if a person is not 
employed under a contract of employment, that does not deny the "employee" all 
constitutional protection. This conclusion is reached despite the fact they "may not be 
employees in the full contractual sense of the word" but because their employment "in 
many respects mirrors those of people employed under a contract of employment." 
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practices,6 it would be strange to have a situation where the pervasive 
constitutional standard of fairness would not be available to those persons 
who are party to an employment contract, merely because a contract exists 
and the traditional emphasis of the rules of contract law is on the lawfulness 
of parties' conduct as opposed to fairness. We have only one system of law, 
which is grounded in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution). The opponents of the constitutional development 
of the common law in order to import fairness into the contract of employment 
will cite the wording of section 8(3) of the Constitution, and explain that such 
development is not necessary or apt because the labour legislation already 
gives effect to the right to fair labour practices and the common law thus need 
not be developed.7 But this argument is premised on the assumption that the 
legislation sufficiently gives effect to the constitutional right. And this may not 
always be the case. In those instances where claimants can show that the 
legislation does not protect them (or does not sufficiently protect them), those 
archaic common-law rules would need to be interpreted or developed to 
import the same constitutional standard of fairness that is applied to those 
other persons deemed to be in an employment relationship sans a contract 
of employment, in order to give substance to the notion that there is only one 
system of law under the Constitution8 as well as the constitutional imperative 
to ensure equality before the law and equal protection for all under the 
equality clause.  
                                            
6  The Constitutional Court recently expanded on this trend to broaden access to fair 
labour practice protection even in the absence of a contract of employment. Froneman 
J observed as follows in Pretorius v Transnet Pension Fund (CC) unreported case 
number CCT95/17 of 25 April 2018 para 48: "Contemporary labour trends highlight 
the need to take a broad view of fair labour practice rights in section 23(1). Fewer and 
fewer people are in formal employment; fewer of those in formal employment have 
union backing and protection. More and more people find themselves in the "twilight 
zone" of employment as supposed "independent contractors" in time-based 
employment subject to faceless multinational companies who may operate from a web 
presence. In short, the LRA tabulated the fair labour practice rights of only those 
enjoying the benefit of formal employment – but not otherwise. Though the facts of 
this case do not involve these considerations, they provide a compelling basis not to 
restrict the protection of section 23 to only those who have contracts of employment." 
7  The view of Wallis JA in the McKenzie case paras 35-37. 
8  As per Chaskalson P in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In 
re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44: "I 
cannot accept [the] contention which treats the common law as a body of law separate 
and distinct from the Constitution. There are not two systems of law, each dealing with 
the same subject matter, each having similar requirements, each operating in its own 
field with its own highest court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives 
its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control." See the 
discussion in section 2 in Part 1. 
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2.1 Some employees may (and do) fall through the legislative cracks  
I would submit that there is ample room for holding that the labour legislation 
does not always protect an employee sufficiently in order to give full effect to 
the constitutional right to fair labour practices. And this may apply also to 
employees who are covered by the legislation (unlike the claimant in Murray). 
One area, of course, where this may be the case is in respect of unfair labour 
practices. The codification of unfair labour practices in section 186(2) of the 
LRA limits its application to a specific number of unfair employer practices 
relating to specific forms of employment conduct related to specified issues. 
Unfair conduct by an employer, which does not fall under this strict 
categorisation, would not provide recourse to a remedy for an unfair labour 
practice. One example is that of the physical transfer of an employee to 
another workplace.9 Transfers of employees are not listed in section 186(2), 
and as long as such unfair conduct relating to transfer does not involve a 
demotion10 or disciplinary action11 or an occupational detriment other than 
dismissal in contravention of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000,12 it 
would not allow such an employee to access the unfair labour practice 
provisions of the LRA. One can surely imagine that a scenario may eventuate 
where an employer may unfairly, and with an improper motive, present, as a 
fait accompli, an employee with a decision to transfer him or her in 
circumstances that may, for example, significantly impact on the employee's 
lifestyle or family responsibilities. If the LRA does not protect such an 
employee, surely the common-law duty of fair dealing should provide a basis 
in terms of which the employee may access a court to obtain an order for 
specific performance or an award of damages?  
Another area where the legislation may have left a lacuna which could 
deprive an employee of protection for unfair employer conduct is in respect 
of the maximum working time provisions of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA). The provisions regarding ordinary hours 
of work as regulated by section 9 of the BCEA13 do not apply to certain 
employees. Section 6 excludes such provisions from applying inter alia to 
                                            
9  See, for instance, MEC, Department of Road & Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 
2008 29 ILJ 272 (E) (hereafter the Giyose case). 
10  Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA. 
11  Section 186(2)(b) of the LRA. 
12  Section 186(2)(d) of the LRA. 
13  "Section 9(1) Subject to this Chapter, an employer may not require or permit an 
employee to work more than— (a) 45 hours in any week; and (b) nine hours in any 
day if the employee works for five days or fewer in a week; or (c) eight hours in any 
day if the employee works on more than five days in a week." 
AM LOUW PART 3 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  6 
senior managerial employees and employees engaged as sales staff who 
travel to the premises of customers and who regulate their own hours of work. 
Again, one can imagine that the employer of such employees may very well 
unfairly demand draconian working hours which may be very detrimental to 
such employees and/or their families. Again, the duty of fair dealing would 
provide recourse in such circumstances. 
Other scenarios may conceivably present; for example, unfair employer 
conduct that falls short of constituting unfair discrimination (even under the 
extended protection provided against unfair discrimination on arbitrary 
grounds by the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA)) and which also 
does not fit into the niche of an unfair labour practice. Or consider the 
scenarios suggested by Bosch regarding psychological harm to an employee 
arising from persistent, generally abrasive and abusive conduct by an 
employer, which does not amount to victimisation under the LRA.14 In all of 
these cases the implied duty of fair dealing could bring satisfactory relief to 
employees who may fall through the legislative cracks (and, importantly, this 
would include recourse to an order for specific performance, which could 
assist in the maintenance of employment relationships and further the 
objectives of the labour legislation). Its recognition through the constitutional 
development of the common-law contract would not fall foul of section 8(3) of 
the Constitution, where the relevant legislation does not sufficiently give effect 
to these employees' right to fair labour practices.15  
                                            
14  Bosch 2006 ILJ 46 remarks as follows: "The LRA 66 of 1995 provides that an 
employee who is subjected to employer conduct that renders a continued employment 
relationship intolerable may terminate the contract of employment and claim to have 
been unfairly dismissed. But the LRA provides no remedy for the employee who is 
subjected to abusive conduct while he or she is still employed, unless perhaps he or 
she is being prejudiced by the employer for exercising a right conferred by the LRA. 
Neither do other pieces of labour legislation, barring instances of discrimination. It is 
not clear why an employee should have to wait until the employer's conduct becomes 
intolerable and terminate the contract of employment before he or she is in a position 
to seek redress against an abusive employer. It would be far more satisfactory for the 
employee to deter employer abuse by bringing a claim for damages for breach of the 
implied term of trust and confidence during the course of the employment relationship, 
or better yet claim damages and request the LC or High Court (HC) to make an order 
of specific performance requiring the employer to act in compliance with the implied 
term." 
15  In fact, I would suggest that Du Toit would agree that such a constitutional 
development of the common law may be an appropriate way to address the relevant 
hiatus in the legislation: "'Constitutional scrutiny' … does not necessarily mean that a 
provision of the LRA which fails to give effect to the right to fair labour practices in all 
its aspects in any given context is per se invalid. Rather, it may reveal a hiatus which 
can be remedied by developing the common law or relying on the constitutional right 
itself." Du Toit 2008 SALJ 104. 
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It is suggested that the need for the implied duty of fair dealing is well 
illustrated in the above cases, where legislative protection may fall short of 
the constitutional standard, but I will go out on a limb and argue that the 
recognition of this duty should not be limited only to those cases. I believe 
that Murray's duty of fair dealing should be deemed to form part of all 
employment contracts (as Cameron JA clearly stated). The consequence of 
this would be – and this statement is, of course, controversial – that this duty 
should also be accessible to employees who may be protected under the 
legislation and may have access to the unfair dismissal and unfair labour 
practice provisions of the LRA. In order to explain this view, I need to deal 
with some of the arguments of those who are critical of such a duty in these 
contexts and who propose a single and exclusive legislative regime for unfair 
dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes. I will deal with these arguments 
in sections 2.3 and 2.4 below, before returning (in section 2.5) to another 
reason why we should recognise the common-law duty of fair dealing. 
2.2 Unlawful equals unfair (and means that a claimant must utilise the 
legislative scheme) 
One argument favoured by opponents of the recognition of a common-law 
duty of fair dealing is that unlawfulness and unfairness overlap to such an 
extent that any claim based on unlawfulness (that is, the breach of such an 
implied term) would invariably be concerned with unfairness. Thus, when the 
claim involves the termination of an employment contract, it would 
automatically have to be brought as an unfair dismissal claim under the LRA. 
Froneman AJA, in his minority judgment in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v 
Wolfaardt,16 was of the opinion that breach of contract claims brought by a 
claimant relying on the unlawful termination of their employment contract 
would invariably involve the fairness of a dismissal, and that a claim for relief 
would thus invariably need to be brought in terms of the statutory unfair 
dismissal scheme of the LRA. This, he argued, was based on the fact that 
unlawful conduct by an employer would invariably also be unfair: 
I am of the view that the common law contract of employment must … give 
some form of expression to that fundamental right not to be unfairly dismissed. 
As soon as the common law does give some expression to that right, I have the 
same kind of difficulty as Nienaber JA had in National Union of Metalworkers of 
SA v Vetsak Cooperative, namely to conceive how an unlawful dismissal would 
not also be an unfair dismissal. And if such a dismissal is unfair any dispute 
about it falls squarely within the opening words of section 191(1) of the Act. In 
short, one of the demands of the Constitution on our common law of 
employment is that it includes a right to a fair dismissal. Dismissal upon an 
                                            
16  Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 1 SA 49 (SCA) (hereafter the Fedlife case). 
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unlawful breach of contract by an employer is an unfair dismissal. And the Act 
deals fully with the consequences of an unfair dismissal.17 
Jafta AJA shared this view – that unlawfulness would inevitably equate to 
unfairness – in Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board,18 where he held 
that a breach of contract by an employer automatically equated to an unfair 
dismissal:  
I conclude that the respondent had no right in law to terminate the contract of 
employment between itself and the appellant. Accordingly, the termination of 
such contract before the end of its term was unfair and constituted an unfair 
dismissal. 
I would suggest, however, that the veracity of this generalisation is 
questionable. Nugent JA, in the majority opinion in Fedlife, seemed to 
indicate that not all cases of unlawfulness would necessarily constitute 
unfairness.19 And Froneman J later appeared to contradict his earlier view as 
expressed in Fedlife.20 It is submitted that there may very well be instances 
                                            
17  Froneman J in the Fedlife case; para 14 of the minority judgment. 
18  Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board 2004 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC) (hereafter the 
Buthelezi case). For further support of this view, but which might rather cynically 
impute questionable motives to claimants in such cases, also see Van Eck and 
Mathiba 2014 ILJ 867-868: "In a minority dissenting decision [in Fedlife], Froneman 
AJA, in our view correctly, held that a common-law termination dispute is about an 
unfair dismissal and therefore it should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions 
of the LRA, which would exclude the High Court from entertaining the matter. More 
often than not the election between either the Labour Court or the High Court was 
based on strategic (or forum shopping) purposes rather than being founded on 
substantive underlying reasons which justified the coexistence of these courts." 
19  Nugent JA said the following in the Fedlife case, para 27 of the majority judgment: "A 
dispute falls within the terms of the [LRA] only if the 'fairness' of the dismissal is the 
subject of the employee's complaint. Where it is not, and the subject in dispute is the 
lawfulness of the dismissal, then the fact that it might also be, and probably is, unfair 
is quite coincidental for that is not what the employee's claim is about. The dispute in 
the present case is not about the fairness of the termination of the respondent's 
contract but about its unlawfulness and for that reason alone does not fall within the 
terms of the [LRA] (even assuming that the termination constituted a 'dismissal' as 
defined in [the LRA]."  
20  In the Giyose case para 29 Froneman J appeared to contradict his own view 
expressed earlier in the Fedlife case, when (in the process of recognising the 
constitutional development of the common-law employment contract to include an 
implied right to a pre-transfer hearing) he remarked as follows regarding the nature of 
the claim where unfairness arises in breach of an implied term regarding a fair 
procedure: "In Gumbi the recognition (as a developed part of the common-law contract 
of employment) of a pre-dismissal right to a hearing was based on considerations of 
fairness arising inter alia from the constitutional right to fair labour practices. The issue 
in dispute in Gumbi concerned the procedural fairness of a dismissal. Gumbi and 
Boxer Superstores thus appear to be authority for the proposition that the common-
law contract of employment may be developed to bring it in line with the constitutional 
right to fair labour practices, but once a right is recognised in this manner the nature 
of its breach becomes a matter of contractual unlawfulness, not of legislative fairness 
under the LRA." 
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where a practical scenario might present where an employer acts in breach 
of contract (unlawfully), but its conduct is nevertheless fair in the 
circumstances or, conversely, where the employer's unfair conduct is not in 
breach of the contract (that is, it is not unlawful). One such scenario 
presented in Buthelezi, where the employer purported prematurely to 
terminate a fixed-term contract of employment for operational requirements, 
while the contract did not make provision for premature termination. Even 
though such a termination may be a breach of the terms of the contract (that 
is, unlawful), would the justification of genuine operational requirements not 
mean that such a breach does not constitute unfairness (and an unfair 
dismissal in terms of the Act)? Cohen provides two further examples of 
instances where an unlawful termination of a contract of employment may not 
necessarily be unfair, or where a fair termination may be unlawful: 
[I]t cannot be assumed that in all circumstances an unlawful dismissal will be 
unfair. While the Labour Courts have sanctioned a departure from the 
procedures and sanctions stipulated in disciplinary codes in appropriate 
circumstances and have made a finding of procedural fairness in this regard, a 
deviation from these procedures may constitute an unlawful contractual breach 
if they are incorporated into a contractually agreed disciplinary code. It is thus 
conceivable that an unlawful breach of an employment contract, actionable in 
the civil courts, may nonetheless satisfy the procedural fairness requirements 
of the LRA. Similarly the fair dismissal of an employee for poor work 
performance, in compliance with the procedures identified in the Code of Good 
Practice: Dismissal, has been held to be fair but unlawful where the 
contractually required notice was not given. Such poor performance was not 
regarded as materially breaching the contract and as a result did not justify the 
summary termination of the employment contract.21  
I would suggest that the above generalisation, the automatic equation of 
unlawfulness and unfairness, does not provide a strong argument against the 
recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing in the present context. The  
reasoning followed by Froneman J in Fedlife (quoted above) and Jafta AJA 
in Buthelezi, which purports to conflate unlawfulness and unfairness in this 
way in order to bring all dismissal claims under the auspices of the LRA's 
unfair dismissal scheme, would in the context of a claimant bringing a 
dismissal claim to court as breach of contract to my mind run contrary to what 
Nugent J expressed in Makhanya v University of Zululand:22 
[A] claim, which exists as a fact, is not capable of being converted into a claim 
of a different kind by the mere use of language. Yet that is often what is sought 
to be done under the guise of what is called 'characterising' the claim. Where 
that word is used to mean 'describing the distinctive character of' the claim that 
is before the court, as a fact, then its use is unexceptionable. But when it is used 
                                            
21  Cohen 2007 SA Merc LJ 28. 
22  Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 30 ILJ 1539 (SCA) (hereafter the Makhanya 
case). 
AM LOUW PART 3 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  10 
to describe an alchemical process that purports to convert the claim into a claim 
of another kind then the word is abused. What then occurs, in truth, is not that 
the claim is converted, but only that the claimant is denied the right to assert 
it.23 
I would submit that this "alchemical conversion" is precisely what happened 
in the above two judgments, by way of semantics, with the outcome being 
that these judges would disallow the respective claimants their right to assert 
the contractual claim.  
If one accepts that there may be cases where a claimant genuinely 
possesses more than one cause of action, as explained in Makhanya, why 
should forum-shopping be as heavily frowned upon as it is by some in the 
legal fraternity? Surely, the role of good lawyers is to pursue the optimum 
relief for their clients in the face of an actionable wrong, and where relying on 
one cause of action as opposed to another would bring better relief (for 
example, greater compensation for harm suffered, or a speedier avenue to 
relief) claimants should not be prevented from exercising their rights under 
law. I would suggest that some of the criticisms that have been expressed by 
opponents of labour dispute forum-shopping are motivated partially by 
frustration at the legislature for failing to remove perceived ambiguities in the 
legislation (in the context of the labour fora/civil courts jurisdictional debate 
referred to in the introduction to this piece). But until such time as the 
legislature decides to remove the possibility of dual causes of action and 
access to the civil courts in employment-related matters, this is the law.24 
And, after all, section 34 of the Constitution entrenches the fundamental right 
to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in 
a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum. Unless and until such time as 
the legislature steps in to deprive claimants of their common-law rights, these 
                                            
23  Per Nugent J, in the Makhanya case para 72. 
24  See the following, as per Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 
177 (hereafter the Chirwa case): "The concern of forum-shopping is a valid one. It is, 
as this Court has recently implied, undesirable for litigants to pick and choose where 
they institute actions in the hope of a better outcome. However, while forum-shopping 
may not be ideal, section 157(2) of the LRA as interpreted in Fredericks confers 
concurrent jurisdiction to decide a claim concerning the right to administrative justice 
in the labour context on two courts. The possibility of forum-shopping is an 
unavoidable consequence of that legislative decision. There have been calls for 
legislative intervention to alter that decision and those calls are not without merit. But 
unless and until the call is heeded, the meaning of section 157(2) is set." 
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rights remain available even though a common-law claim may arise in the 
context of employment. This complies with the Constitution.25 
A final point to make is that the accuracy of the previously-expressed notion 
that as soon as a claimant's complaint regarding a dismissal relates to its 
unfairness "any dispute about it falls squarely within the opening words of 
section 191(1) of the [LRA]"26 is also questionable. Froneman J said this 
because at the time the common law was taken to concern itself with the 
lawfulness of a dismissal (was it a breach of the contract?) while only the LRA 
provided for testing its fairness. But in the wake of Murray, a dismissal could 
constitute a breach of the employment contract as a result of its unfairness. 
The employer's unfair conduct would be in breach of its implied duty of 
dealing fairly with the employee. And the opening words of section 191 of the 
LRA ("If there is a dispute about the fairness of a dismissal … the dismissed 
employee … may refer the dispute in writing" to a bargaining council or the 
CCMA) does not, to my mind, exclude the possibility of referring a breach of 
contract claim to a court, which entails a dispute about the fairness of a 
dismissal as a result of a claimed breach of the duty of fair dealing.  
2.3 The intention of the legislature and the policy reasons behind the 
legislative unfair dismissal (and unfair labour practice) scheme 
Another argument brought against the recognition of the implied duty of fair 
dealing by its opponents is based on the separation of powers between the 
legislature and the judiciary, and the policy grounds behind the statutory 
unfair dismissal scheme contained in chapter VIII of the LRA. The argument 
goes that courts should adjudicate individual disputes on the facts before 
them and leave the consideration of labour relations policy to the 
democratically elected legislature. Wallis AJA, in McKenzie, devoted 
significant attention to this. He referred to the English case of Johnson v 
Unisys Ltd,27 where the majority of the law lords held that it would be 
inappropriate to allow an employee to recover damages for breach of contract 
(breach of the implied term of trust and confidence) arising from a dismissal, 
as this would circumvent the statutory scheme for unfair dismissal protection, 
which scheme exists because of policy reasons. The High Court of Australia 
                                            
25  Cameron JA observed as follows in the Chirwa case para 65: "We must end where 
we began: with the Constitution. I can find in it no suggestion that, where more than 
one right may be in issue, its beneficiaries should be confined to a single legislatively 
created scheme of rights. I can find in it no intention to prefer one legislative 
embodiment of a protected right over another; nor any preferent entrenchment of 
rights or of the legislation springing from them." 
26  Froneman J in the Fedlife case para 14. 
27  Johnson v Unisys Ltd 2001 UKHL 13 (hereafter the Johnson case). 
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similarly held that the implication of an implied duty of trust and confidence in 
the employment contract in that jurisdiction is a job for the legislature and not 
for the courts.28 Du Toit has written forcefully about the policy objectives of 
the labour legislation and decries the usurping of the legislature's role by the 
judiciary in the line of SCA cases referred to earlier: 
[C]ommon-law judges are being invested with considerably broader discretion 
than that permitted by the LRA in fashioning precedent-setting remedies in 
areas of immense socio-economic sensitivity and importance. The process of 
judicial law-making (for that is effectively what it amounts to) is complicated 
further by the adversarial nature of the process: disputes are argued by parties 
who are out to score points and win their case, with little or no thought for longer-
term social goals. Judges are left to make critical decisions based on their 
personal interpretation of open-ended contractual rights and duties, such as 'fair 
dealing' or 'trust and confidence', much as the Industrial Court was at large to 
give meaning to the meaning of 'unfair labour practice'. It does not seem right.29  
I would suggest that the role of the courts in this context may be less 
problematic when considered against the backdrop of the constitutional duty 
placed on the courts to develop the common law where necessary. Du Toit30 
and others31 have argued that such development of the common law in cases 
such as Fedlife and Murray was not necessary, in the light of the LRA's 
extensive regulation of unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices. But this 
determination should be made with due consideration of the relevant 
objectives of the legislation and the reasons behind its specific rights 
protection scheme, as well as the continued role of the common law in the 
light of the Bill of Rights (as referred to in section 2 of Part 1). This raises the 
issue of the interaction between the intention of the legislature with the 
promulgation of labour legislation and the traditional role of the common law 
of contract, within the contested space of the employment relationship: 
                                            
28  As the majority of the court held in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker 2014 
HCA 32 paras 40-41 (hereafter the Barker case): "The complex policy considerations 
[around the implication of an implied duty of trust and confidence] mark it, in the 
Australian context, as a matter more appropriate for the legislature than for the courts 
to determine. It may, of course, be open to legislatures to enshrine the implied term in 
statutory form and leave it to the courts, according to the processes of the common 
law, to construe and apply it. It is a different thing for the courts to assume that 
responsibility for themselves ... Importantly, the implied duty of trust and confidence 
… is directed, in broad terms, to the relationship between employer and employee 
rather than to performance of the contract. It depends upon a view of social conditions 
and desirable social policy that informs a transformative approach to the contract of 
employment in law. It should not be accepted as applicable, by the judicial branch of 
government, to employment contracts in Australia."  
29  Du Toit 2010 ILJ 41. 
30  In Du Toit 2008 SALJ 95-133; Du Toit 2010 ILJ 21. 
31  See the judgment of Pillay J in Mohlaka v Minister of Finance 2009 30 ILJ 622 (LC). 
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Contract law enforces the voluntarily made obligations between parties by 
awarding damages should they renege. Statutory regulation imposes 
mandatory obligations on employers to comply with minimum entitlements of 
employees. Compliance with the latter is determined by industrial tribunals, 
rather than courts, and it addresses policy of broad public interest, rather than 
the interests of contracting individuals.32 
A primary objective of the LRA and other labour legislation is to promote and 
advance social justice.33 The BCEA does this, for example, through the 
provision of a floor of rights to employees in respect of their basic terms and 
conditions of employment. The LRA, for example, does this by providing a 
scheme for unfair dismissal remedies. These protections are there primarily 
to address the plight of vulnerable workers (see, for example the role of the 
earnings threshold in respect of employees' entitlement to protection under 
certain provisions of the legislation), in order to protect such vulnerable 
workers against exploitation arising from the employer's superior bargaining 
power, and to promote social justice for these workers. In Fedlife Nugent J 
made it clear that the introduction of the legislation does not mean that those 
more fortunate, less vulnerable employees have thus automatically lost their 
pre-existing rights under the common law of contract. The common law still, 
and validly (also in our constitutional dispensation) has the role of holding 
contracting parties to their bargains. This includes not only the negative 
aspect of protecting a party against a breach of the contract by the other 
party, but also the positive aspect of promoting the pursuit of each party's 
interests under the contract (mindful of the interests of the other party). In the 
light of the universal coverage of the constitutional guarantee of fair labour 
practices, the relational nature of the employment contract and the dignity of 
work (and especially the important role that gainful employment plays in 
allowing persons to access material benefits including food and housing, 
financial services, social security and socio-economic advancement), it is 
submitted that an implied duty of fair dealing in the employment relationship 
must be taken to be a naturalium of the bargain between the contracting 
parties. 
Wallis AJA relied heavily on the judgment of the House of Lords in Johnson, 
and the sentiments expressed there regarding the untenable position of 
allowing persons protected by legislation from circumventing the statutory 
scheme for disputes based on the protections offered by such legislation. 
Wallis AJA concluded this line of reasoning by referring to Du Toit's following 
view: 
                                            
32  Wahlstrom-Schatt Dismissal of the Implied Term of Mutual Trust 10. 
33  See, generally, Matlou 2016 SA Merc LJ 544. 
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To infer the existence of a common law right duplicating the statutory right is to 
call into question the purpose of enacting the statutory right.34  
This reference to the overlapping of statutory and common-law remedies is a 
key argument of opponents of the recognition of an implied common-law duty 
of fair dealing, which raises the issue of the separation of powers between 
the legislature and the judiciary, and the proper role of the legislature (as 
opposed to the courts) in formulating and implementing universally-
applicable labour law policy as against the adjudication of individual disputes 
on the peculiar facts before a court.35 As Wallis AJA put it in McKenzie: "[T]he 
courts must be astute not to allow the legislative expression of the 
constitutional right [to fair labour practices] to be circumvented by way of the 
side-wind of an implied term in contracts of employment."36 In other systems, 
where courts have turned their face against the recognition of implied terms 
of this nature, this argument frequently held sway (see Johnson37 in the UK, 
Wallace v United Grain Growers38 in Canada, and Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Barker39 in Australia). Of course, it bears saying that there are two 
                                            
34  Du Toit 2008 SALJ 96-97, as referred to in the McKenzie case para 35. 
35  Du Toit 2008 SALJ 118 observes the following regarding the interaction between these 
sources of law: "Legislation, as every lawyer knows, may amend the common law or 
leave it unamended. To leave it at that, however, is to misunderstand the role of 
legislation in a constitutional dispensation. Legislation is the product of deliberate 
policy, informed by constitutional imperatives and values, setting out to mould, 
supplement or replace common-law rules in the light of those values as well as 
governmental duties and socio-economic objectives derived from the Constitution. 
The LRA, in particular, was drafted with careful reference to the requirements of the 
Constitution and international law, following intensive negotiation between 
government, business and labour. The protection of employees against unfair 
termination of employment, balanced by the employer's right to terminate fairly, is a 
particularly sensitive aspect of the right to fair labour practices. In the result 'unfair 
dismissal', to all intents and purposes, has been placed on a par with fundamental 
breach of contract, accompanied by specific, and no less carefully crafted, remedies." 
36  McKenzie case para 33. 
37  The Johnson case para 2, per Lord Nicholls: "On this appeal the appellant seeks 
damages for loss he claims he suffered as a result of the manner in which he was 
dismissed ... But there is an insuperable obstacle: the intervention of Parliament in the 
unfair dismissal legislation. Having heard full argument on the point, I am persuaded 
that a common law right embracing the manner in which an employee is dismissed 
cannot satisfactorily co-exist with the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed. A 
newly developed common law right of this nature, covering the same ground as the 
statutory right, would fly in the face of the limits Parliament has already prescribed on 
matters such as the classes of employees who have the benefit of the statutory right, 
the amount of compensation payable and the short time limits for making claims. It 
would also defeat the intention of Parliament that claims of this nature should be 
decided by specialist tribunals, not the ordinary courts of law."  
38  Wallace v United Grain Growers 1997 3 SCR 701 paras 75-76. 
39  The Barker case para 40, where the majority held as follows: "The complex policy 
considerations encompassed by [the implication of the term of trust and confidence] 
mark it, in the Australian context, as a matter more appropriate for the legislature than 
for the courts to determine. It may, of course, be open to legislatures to enshrine the 
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very important differences between the South African situation and the above 
jurisdictions. South African courts are enjoined (and, in fact, obliged) by 
section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights to develop the common law in line with the 
Bill of Rights, where necessary to give proper effect to fundamental rights. 
Also, South Africa is rather unique in respect of the inclusion of an express 
fundamental right to fair labour practices in its Bill of Rights, which, in the 
context of section 39(2), would strengthen the case for judicial activism 
(where required) in developing and expanding the role of fairness under the 
common law.  
Essentially, these arguments appear to implicate the principle or theory of 
judicial deference to the other branches of government, in this case the 
legislature, in furtherance of the separation of powers. Commentators (and 
some judges) argue that the legislature is better placed to determine and set 
policy, and courts should refrain from treading on such policy determinations 
in the course of deciding individual cases on an ad hoc basis. But judicial 
deference has been criticised. Brand, for example, is critical of deference 
showed by the courts in cases involving socio-economic rights,40 while 
Klaasen has criticised deference in cases involving judicial review in public 
litigation.41 There may be merit to the idea that the legislature is best placed 
to deal with broad labour relations and socio-economic development policy. 
But I think that our system of labour law might require more active 
participation from the judiciary in respect of the development of law (even 
where this occurs, of course, in the context of individual cases). In section 2 
of Part 1 I referred to what I believe to be the rather unique nature of our 
labour law. Within the "one system of law" it is a system where the common 
law has survived more robustly than in some other branches of law (such as 
administrative law). And within the constitutional context of a constitutional 
duty on courts to develop this common law in line with the Bill of Rights, 
coupled with the unique constitutional entrenchment of fairness in the right to 
fair labour practices, it seems that the courts have a special role to play, which 
is one that may require them to be less deferential to the legislature. Be that 
as it may, even if one were to require the courts to defer to the legislature in 
respect of the determination of policy, this leaves the question of what the 
actual legislative intention behind such a policy-based framework 
                                            
implied term in statutory form and leave it to the courts, according to the processes of 
the common law, to construe and apply it. It is a different thing for the courts to assume 
that responsibility for themselves."  
40  Brand 2011 Stell LR 614. 
41  Klaasen 2015 PELJ 1901-1929. 
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(specifically, here, in the context of protection against unfair labour practices 
and unfair dismissal in the LRA) really is. 
This is something that I believe the SCA in McKenzie did not sufficiently 
consider. Mention was made above of the central thread of the labour 
legislation in seeking to protect and promote the rights of vulnerable 
employees. This is found in various provisions whose application are made 
subject to the level of earnings of targeted employees; in the statutory 
presumption of who is an "employee" (which is aimed at assisting lower-
earning workers to obtain the protection of the legislation); in provisions, 
regulations and sectoral determinations targeting vulnerable employees in 
sectors where collective bargaining may be less prevalent; and in provisions 
providing special protection to vulnerable employees engaged on fixed-term 
contracts or in atypical employment (for example, employees placed with 
clients by temporary employment services), to mention but a few examples. 
In the context of the right not to be unfairly dismissed, the intention of the 
legislature in enacting this statutory right was to bring protection to vulnerable 
workers who would, under the common law, otherwise be subjected to the 
superior bargaining power of the employer, the potential exploitation of such 
superior power by the employer, the vagaries of common law principles which 
focus on the lawfulness of the termination of a contract rather than its fairness 
and, significantly, the lack of resources to take a case to the courts. But in 
Fedlife Nugent J reminded us that there is another class of employees who 
may be less vulnerable to employer exploitation and who (continue to) enjoy 
pre-existing common-law rights to claim for damages or other contractual 
remedies in cases of breach of contract by their employers: 
A right not to be unfairly dismissed finds its application pre-eminently in 
circumstances in which the employee has no contractual security of 
employment. While it is understandable that the legislature wished to enhance 
the security of that class of employees I can see no reason why it should have 
exacted a prejudicial quid pro quo from another class of employees entirely in 
order to do so. In my view there is simply no logical or conceptual connection 
between the rights that have been afforded on the one hand and those that are 
said to have been abolished on the other.42 
In his minority judgment in the Constitutional Court in the seminal contract 
law case of Barkhuizen v Napier,43 Sachs J declared that "the rich, too, have 
rights". In the context of consumer protection (specifically, regarding the use 
of confusing and misleading standard form contracts filled with legalese and 
                                            
42  The Fedlife case para 20 of the majority judgment. 
43  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) (hereafter the Barkhuizen case). 
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fine print) he stated the following, which I believe is apt also in the context of 
the legal protection of the rights of employees vis a vis their employers: 
[T]he fact that consumer protection is specially important for the poor does not 
imply that it is irrelevant for the rich. The rich too have rights. They have the 
same entitlement as everybody else to fair treatment in their capacity as 
consumers. If, in our new constitutional order, the quality of public policy, like 
the quality of mercy and justice, is not strained, then the wealthy must be as 
entitled to their day in court as the poor.44 
This may prove an unpopular argument,45 but I would suggest that the 
existence of the (policy reasons behind the) statutory scheme regulating 
unfair dismissals does not have to prove such an insuperable barrier to 
recognising that all employees – but particularly less vulnerable employees 
("the rich") – retain their common-law rights in cases of dismissal, contrary to 
the findings in McKenzie and in Johnson.  
The first pillar of this argument is based on the presumption against legislative 
alteration of the existing law (the common law in this case) when interpreting 
a statute which is less than clear, as well as the presumption against the 
deprivation of existing rights, as considered in Fedlife. Nugent J made it clear 
that the LRA contains no clear indication that the intention of the legislature 
in formulating the statutory unfair dismissal scheme was to change the 
availability of recourse to common-law remedies, or to deprive such 
employees of the existing right to claim contractual remedies for breach by 
the employer. As Nugent J pointed out, section 195 of the LRA, in fact, 
expressly provides that an order or award of compensation in consequence 
of an unfair dismissal is "in addition to and not a substitute for any other 
amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of … [a] contract of 
employment."46 And it should be noted that, despite the earlier academic and 
judicial debate regarding the desirability of the continued availability of 
contractual remedies alongside the legislative remedies, this section of the 
Act was not amended by the legislature in the spate of significant legislative 
                                            
44  The Barkhuizen case para 149. 
45  Du Toit, for one, is critical of separate systems of labour dispute resolution in respect 
of their implications for access to justice: "[T]he majority judgment in Fedlife flies in the 
face of established principles of constitutional interpretation … and the system by 
which the legislature sought to give effect to the right to fair labour practices. In effect, 
it allows litigants to circumvent that system at will. Worse, it may inadvertently have 
laid a basis for separate systems of labour dispute resolution: one for the rich and one 
for the poor. Common-law remedies can only be pursued by employees who have 
access to the resources to litigate in the courts; for the vast majority of employees the 
system created by the LRA offers the only redress." Du Toit 2010 ILJ 26.  
46  The Fedlife case, para 19 of the majority judgment. 
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amendments in the past few years following McKenzie and the line of earlier 
cases that grappled with the "jurisdictional quagmire".  
That being said, the availability of common-law remedies may indeed be a 
spectre not unlike an ephemeral desert mirage for vulnerable, low-earning 
employees who lack the resources to pursue expensive breach of contract 
claims in court (as opposed to the speedy, inexpensive and more accessible 
forum of the CCMA). But certain employees – for example, senior executives 
on lucrative fixed-term contracts – may have the resources to pursue their 
common-law claims, with the possibility of receiving more in the form of 
compensation for harm caused by means of an award of contractual 
damages. Providing a straitjacket to restrict these latter employees, by 
ensuring that they have recourse only to LRA rights and remedies, would take 
away from this class of employees the rights they enjoyed under the common 
law, which Nugent J says would be wrong. The presumptions referred to in 
his judgment would surely militate against this, as would the foundational 
principle of our law of contract, pacta sunt servanda, which still largely enjoys 
its hegemonic position in contract law in our constitutional dispensation. 
The second pillar of the argument is based squarely on the constitutional 
guarantee of fair labour practices, which applies to "everyone" (including less 
vulnerable employees - "the rich"). Wallis AJA in McKenzie referred to section 
8(3) of the Constitution and held that development of the common law to 
recognise an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed was not necessary, as 
the LRA already gives effect to the constitutional right. Coupled with the 
reasoning in this judgment that such an implied term would simply duplicate 
the LRA protections, this raises the question whether the LRA protections 
duplicate this less vulnerable class of employees' pre-existing common-law 
rights, or whether in fact they provide for something less. The answer seems 
to be clear; it is the latter. Much was made in McKenzie (as in Johnson) of 
the policy considerations behind the statutory unfair dismissal schemes (in 
South Africa and the UK respectively), which led inter alia to the capping of 
compensation in unfair dismissal disputes. Although contractual damages 
are decided on a case-by-case basis, at least in principle the capping of 
statutory compensation constitutes a limitation of the potential compensation 
a claimant under the common law could be awarded by way of contractual 
damages. The legislation has curtailed the potential remedy for those 
claimant employees who might realistically have access to the common-law 
remedies. Is this justifiable on the basis of the policy considerations referred 
to in these judgments? As stated above, the intention of the legislature in 
fashioning the unfair dismissal provisions of the LRA appears to have been 
primarily the objective of protecting vulnerable employees who would 
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otherwise lack real and effective access to common-law remedies. There is 
little if any evidence of a legislative intention to punish those employees who 
have the resources to pursue the exercise of their existing common-law 
rights. If the policy consideration of promoting economic development and 
employment by curtailing large awards of damages against employers is 
invoked here, surely this is something that a court could (and would) consider 
in arriving at the quantum of an award for damages?  
I am not arguing for a potentially unfairly discriminatory system which would 
provide greater protection to the rich than it does to the poor. An implied duty 
of fair dealing – including an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed – should 
be available to all employees. But the LRA scheme provides a better and 
more accessible avenue for the vulnerable employee, which is in line with the 
objectives of the Act. It might sound harsh, but this would reflect a reality in 
society in respect of access to resources, as well as in respect of access to 
the law. By way of analogy, on a rather prosaic level: the rich may enjoy the 
benefits of an expensive cell phone contract (such as lower data rates and 
bundles, and free calls), while the pay-as-you-go option provides a 
mechanism for the poor to access services which may be more basic but get 
the job done. Are the LRA rights and remedies relating to unfair labour 
practices and unfair dismissal the legislative equivalent of the R10 airtime 
voucher? And, if so, is it problematic, for the purposes of the law, that there 
exists alongside it an expensive cell phone contract which may be 
inaccessible to the poor and accessible only to a select few who have the 
means to afford it? I know that this line of reasoning might sound insensitive 
to the plight of the poor and of vulnerable, low-earning workers. Du Toit 
criticises the majority judgment in Fedlife and the parallel system of 
contractual employment disputes which it sanctioned. One point of criticism 
for the author is this disparity between the position of vulnerable and less 
vulnerable employees: 
Common-law remedies can only be pursued by employees who have access to 
the resources to litigate in the courts; for the vast majority of employees the 
system created by the LRA offers the only redress ... [T]he majority view in 
Fedlife [was] that it would be "bereft of any rationality" to "confine" an employee 
whose fixed-term has been unlawfully terminated "to the limited and entirely 
arbitrary compensation yielded by the application of the formula in s 194" of the 
LRA. "Bereft of any rationality" or not, the LRA in giving effect to s 23(1) of the 
Constitution deliberately limits compensation for unfair dismissal to these 
"limited and entirely arbitrary" amounts. The question here is not whether it 
behoves any court to be quite so dismissive of the constitutional scheme which 
it is bound to uphold. The point is rather that it accentuates the inequality being 
created between different classes of litigants - in effect, between more and less 
generous remedies based on litigants' access to resources. Truly vulnerable 
workers on fixed-term contract hardly benefit from the theoretical possibility of 
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pursuing claims for contractual damages in the High Court (HC) or the Labour 
Court (LC).47 
This may well seem, and may very well be, grossly unfair. But would such 
disparate access to recourse in law (vulnerable workers follow the LRA 
avenue, while other employees may be able to afford to go the common-law 
route, with better prospects of compensation for harm suffered) be 
unconstitutional? Would this be unequal protection before the law, if the 
inequality is not as a result of the law itself (both classes, after all, enjoy the 
same rights) but rather as a result of the sad socio-economic realities in our 
deeply unequal society? When Du Toit points out that truly vulnerable 
employees hardly benefit from the theoretical possibility of pursuing 
contractual claims in court, does this not ignore the fact that this was also the 
pre-constitutional, pre-LRA and pre-Fedlife position? Are both these classes 
of employees, on balance, not better off in the constitutional dispensation? 
And, I would suggest, this highlights the actual intention of the legislature 
behind the statutory unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice schemes. In 
the House of Lords in Johnson Lord Hoffman quoted Judge Ansell in posing 
the following question: 
[T]here is not one hint in the authorities that the ... tens of thousands of people 
that appear before the tribunals can have, as it were, a possible second bite in 
common law and I ask myself, if this is the situation, why on earth do we have 
this special statutory framework?48 
The short answer in the context of the LRA, I would suggest, is that the 
legislature recognised the inaccessibility of existing common-law remedies to 
vulnerable employees, and the statutory scheme was set up to provide 
access to a new raft of remedies in a speedy and inexpensive manner. The 
intention was to broaden access to justice but, as Nugent JA held in Fedlife, 
there is no evidence in the LRA that broadening access to justice in this way 
was intended, as a quid pro quo, to curtail the existing rights of the more 
fortunate class of less vulnerable employees who were not in need of such a 
new legislative scheme to begin with. In her minority judgment in the case of 
Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust Lady Hale 
explained the intention behind the legislative scheme for unfair dismissal in 
the UK: 
There is no reason at all to suppose that, in enacting the Industrial Relations 
Act 1971, Parliament intended to cut down upon or reduce the remedies 
available to employees whose employers acted in breach of their contracts of 
employment. Quite the reverse. Parliament intended to create a new statutory 
remedy for unfair dismissal which would supplement whatever rights the 
                                            
47  Du Toit 2010 ILJ 26-27. 
48  The Johnson case para 57. 
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employee already had under his contract of employment. Parliament did that 
because most employees had very few rights under their contracts of 
employment. In particular, although many employees had a reasonable 
expectation that they would stay in their jobs unless and until there was a good 
reason to dispense with their services, most of them had no legal right to do so. 
The 1971 Act gave them the right not to be dismissed without what appeared 
at the time to be a good reason, determined after a fair process. They were to 
be compensated, within modest limits, not principally for their hurt feelings but 
for the loss of their job. That the main target of the new jurisdiction is the loss of 
the job is borne out by the later inclusion of the remedy of reinstatement.49 
Lady Hale continued to observe that there was no intention on the part of the 
legislature to interfere with the contractual rights of those employees who 
could show a "right to the job" (that is, who could rely on an express term to 
be dismissed for just cause, or tenured employees), and explained that the 
ratio of Johnson should be limited and understood in terms of the very specific 
"territory which Parliament had occupied" by means of the labour legislation: 
[In Johnson] the House of Lords was persuaded that the common law implied 
term [of trust and confidence], developed for a different purpose, should not be 
extended to cover the territory which Parliament had occupied. In fact, the 
territory which Parliament had occupied was the lack of a remedy for loss of a 
job to which the employee had no contractual right beyond the contractual 
notice period. Parliament occupied that territory by requiring employers to act 
fairly when they dismissed their employees. But there was and is nothing in the 
legislation to take away the existing contractual rights of employees. There was 
and is nothing to suggest that Parliament intended to limit the entitlement of 
those few employees who did and do have a contractual right to the job, the 
right not to be dismissed without cause.50  
The legislature in South Africa similarly intended to provide a special 
protection scheme for the most vulnerable workers. We find this not only in 
the unfair labour practice and unfair dismissal provisions of the LRA, but also 
in its collective bargaining scheme. The vast majority of trade union members 
in South Africa are lower-earning employees. The less vulnerable, high-
earning employees tend not to be significantly unionised. This again shows 
that the LRA cannot provide a one-size-fits-all solution to these different 
classes of employees, but the system that it provides (in conjunction with the 
supplementary avenue of access to common-law remedies) is one that 
seems, upon reflection, to provide largely satisfactory coverage on the basis 
of a (possibly somewhat eclectic) collection of swings and roundabouts. The 
champions of the rights of vulnerable employees are the accessible dispute 
resolution system of the CCMA and trade unions. Less vulnerable employees 
are largely able to take care of themselves without union intervention, and 
                                            
49  Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust and Botham v Ministry 
of Defence 2011 UKSC 58 para 111 (hereafter the Edwards case). 
50  The Edwards case para 121. 
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the contractual remedies (and also access to the civil courts) serve to balance 
things out on the scales of ensuring access to protection against unfair labour 
practices and access to effective remedies for wronged complainants.  
Who are these vulnerable workers? As I write this, I do not have accurate 
information to hand to determine the proportion of employees who earn below 
the earnings threshold in the labour legislation.51 But there are clues that point 
to the fact that the vast majority of employees earn below the threshold. 
Based on a compilation of their Quarterly Labour Force Surveys for 2014, 
Statistics South Africa estimated that 60% of workers in South Africa earned 
R4 200 a month at that time.52 And an online report in January 2017 
compared the national average annual wage to that of top CEOs in South 
Africa, with an unsettling conclusion:  
'While CEOs in South Africa make far less on average than their American 
counterparts, their salaries were 541 times more than the average income in 
their own country,'' Quartz reported on Thursday. 'It took CEOs in South Africa 
just over seven hours to make $13 194 (R180 251), which is the country's 
average yearly wage. Assuming Monday, January 2, was a public holiday and 
they started work at 07:30 on Tuesday, January 3, CEOs in South Africa clocked 
in the annual average wage by 15:00 that day.'53 
Does the intention of the legislature behind the relevant provisions of the 
labour legislation reflect these disparities between different classes of 
employees? If so, does the failure of the legislature to amend the legislation 
subsequent to Fedlife, McKenzie and the other SCA judgments considered 
here in order to remove the possibility of common-law claims in employment 
matters (and/or to abolish the duty of fair dealing) indicate an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the legislation cannot provide a one-size-
fits-all system for protecting these different classes of employees?  
We need to interrogate the clues found in the legislation. Mention has already 
been made of the intention that clearly manifests in various provisions of the 
legislation to target vulnerable employees (something that has been only 
more clearly displayed in the eventual 2015 amendments, such as the new 
section 198A and 198B provisions in the LRA dealing with atypical 
employment (workers placed by temporary employment services) and fixed-
term contracts). A further indication may be found in the ultimately abandoned 
attempts by the legislature to further distinguish between vulnerable and non-
                                            
51  Set at the time of writing at R 205 433.30 per annum. 
52  From a report dated 23 March 2016, Africa Check 2016 
https://africacheck.org/reports/do-60-of-south-african-workers-earn-less-than-r5000-
a-month/.  
53  From a report on Fin24: Fin24 2017 https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ceos-in-sa-will-
earn-your-annual-salary-in-7-hours-20170106.  
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vulnerable employees in respect of unfair dismissal, in the 2010 and 2012 
Labour Relations Amendment Bills. The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 
2010 suggested the insertion of a section 187A in the Act, with the following 
provisions:  
Limitation on application of Chapter VIII 187A.  
An employee earning in excess of an amount determined by the Minister by 
notice in the Gazette, may not refer labour disputes in respect of the provisions 
of sections 185, 186, 188, 189, 189A and 197 to the CCMA. 
A media release published in December 2010 briefly explained the objective 
of the proposed new section 187A as follows: 
Other amendments proposed include … the exclusion of employees earning 
more than a specific amount from referring their labour disputes to the CCMA 
with a view to ensuring that 'vulnerable employees' are not prejudiced by the 
volume of complaints from those who can afford to approach the courts.54  
The proposed new section 187A was not included in the Labour Relations 
Amendment Bill, 2012, but this latter Bill was even more ambitious in 
proposing a special dismissal regime for non-vulnerable employees through 
the insertion of a new section 188B in the Act (also subsequently abandoned 
in the 2014 amendments to the LRA). The actual text of the proposed section 
188B is not included in the version of the 2012 Amendment Bill which was 
available online at the time of writing55, but the following, from the 
memorandum of objects of the Bill, deserves to be quoted here in full: 
Insertion of section 188B of Act 66 of 1995 
This section is inserted to create more flexibility for employers in dealing with 
the dismissal of high earning employees. It does so without detracting from the 
rights of these employees not to be dismissed for reasons that would be 
automatically unfair under section 187, or their rights to seek redress for unfair 
labour practices defined in section 186. At the heart of the change is the 
disproportionate cost, complexity, and impact on an employer's operations of 
procedures to terminate the employment of high earning employees in 
circumstances where the reason for doing so may not fall clearly and neatly 
within the fair reasons for dismissal specified in section 188(1)(a)(i) and (ii). By 
                                            
54  See DoL 2010 http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/labour/articles/labour-bills-published-
comment. The Food and Allied Workers Union, in its submission to the Department of 
Labour on the Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2010, submitted the following: 
"Proposed section 187 A. We are concern (sic) about the insertion of this section as it 
has the potential of denying access to the CCMA by certain employees. We propose 
that the threshold be not less than [R]500 000 alternatively such employee to be 
charged a particular fee when they refer matters to the CCMA." From the FAWU 
submission: FAWU 2010 http://www.fawu.org.za/docs/news/2011/ 
amenment_acts.pdf.  
55  DoL 2012 http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/bills/bill/LRA%20 
bill16d-2012.pdf.  
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way of example, an employer may reasonably and fairly wish to replace a senior 
executive to secure a change in tone and culture within the leadership team, 
because the executive does not fit or no longer fits within the leadership team, 
because internal or external circumstances have changed, or because the 
employer wants to embark on a new direction for the business or enterprise. 
These reasons do not comfortably fall within the reasons for dismissal specified 
in section 188, but are widely recognised as legitimate reasons to replace senior 
employees. In addition, senior executives in practice exercise the role of 
employer in many respects, and usually occupy a special position of trust in 
relation to the employer. The uncertainty created by the application of section 
188 in these situations leads to significant inflexibility and inefficiency at the top 
levels of a business or state enterprise. At the same time, the cost of asserting 
discipline and performance standards at senior levels is notoriously difficult to 
manage, and conflict at this senior executive level that results from efforts to 
terminate employment imposes significant constraints, measured in cost and 
efficiency, on both public and private sector employers. The primary rationale 
for providing statutory protection against unfair dismissal, and for providing 
remedies for unfair dismissal as a species of unfair labour practice, is the 
inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee. Providing 
uniform protection against unfair dismissal to lower skilled or lower paid 
employees, on the one hand, and highly skilled or highly paid executives, on 
the other, fails to recognise the significant difference in bargaining power that 
employees in these categories have in negotiating employment contracts and 
in dealing with their employers during employment. Senior executives and 
highly paid employees are generally able to influence to a material extent the 
terms on which they are engaged, and to make decisions about whether and 
on what terms to take up employment with a particular employer. A number of 
comparable foreign jurisdictions exclude the application of dismissal protection 
to senior executive or highly paid employees. The amended section opts to 
apply the new provisions to employees earning above a specified remuneration 
threshold rather than by reference to their status or role within the employer's 
enterprise. This approach will avoid the need for disputes about whether 
employees fall inside or outside an identified class of employee, that may give 
rise to costly collateral litigation. It is intended that the remuneration threshold 
will be a relatively high threshold, in excess of R1 million per annum, with the 
actual threshold to be determined by the Minister from time to time taking into 
account the considerations set out in subsection (4) of the new section. The 
amendments do not preclude the termination of employment of high earning 
employees summarily or on shorter notice where this is justified applying the 
provisions of section 188. In that event these employees, like all others, will be 
entitled to exercise the remedies provided by the LRA. Where employers elect, 
however, to give the minimum period of notice or any longer period provided for 
in the contract of employment, this will be deemed to be fair for the purposes of 
section 188, though it would not affect any claim brought under section 187. 
The amendments seek to draw a fair balance between the rights and economic 
interests of employers, enabling employers to achieve efficiency and flexibility 
at senior levels, and the rights and interests of highly paid employees, who 
remain protected against arbitrary or summary action. A transitional provision 
will make the new regime applicable to existing contracts of employment of 
employees earning above the threshold after two years. This will provide all 
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parties with an opportunity to reconsider and, where necessary, to renegotiate 
the terms of the employment relationship during that period.56  
Comment at the time (posted online on Labourguide) explained the apparent 
intention behind this proposed provision as follows: 
The Minister also proposed distinguishing between higher and lower income 
earners in cases of dismissal. In instances where an employee earning above 
the threshold prescribed by the Minister (likely to be in the region of R1 million) 
is dismissed, that dismissal shall be deemed to be for a fair reason and effected 
in accordance with a fair procedure if the employer gives the employee notice 
(being notice in writing equal to three months or a longer period as specified in 
the employee's contract of employment) or pays the employee in lieu of such 
notice. Arguable (sic), although this amendment will not deprive higher paid 
employees of the right to challenge their dismissals, it will mean that these 
employees, rather than their employers, will bear the onus to prove that the 
dismissal was unfair, potentially making it very difficult for higher earning 
employees to prove that they have been unfairly dismissed.57 
As already said, this proposed section 188B was abandoned in the 
subsequent LRA amendments in 2015. But this and the earlier proposed new 
section 187A are clearly indicative of an understanding on the part of the 
legislature that the positions of vulnerable employees and of high-earning, 
less-vulnerable employees are vastly different and may require a differential 
approach not only to the applicable unfair dismissal scheme but also to 
access to dispute resolution. And each of these two proposed new provisions 
was not a once-off anomaly; the proposals appeared in multiple iterations of 
the amendment Bills.  
The above-quoted section from the memorandum of objects to the 2012 
amendment Bill (and especially the sections marked in italics) reflect a 
legislative acknowledgement of the unique position of high-earning 
employees. They generally enjoy greater equality of bargaining power with 
their employers; they enjoy a greater degree of autonomy in the formulation 
of their terms and conditions of employment; they are, due to the first two 
characteristics, less open to potential exploitation by their employers; and 
they enjoy greater power to access the courts in unfair dismissal and other 
disputes. And such a proposed limitation or qualification of high-earning 
employees' access to the right not to be unfairly dismissed would suggest 
that the legislature had in mind that these employees may often be able to 
                                            
56  From the Labour Relations Amendment Bill: DoL 2012 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/bills/proposed-amendment-
bills/memoofobjectslra.pdf. Emphasis added. 
57  From a piece by Vatalidis and Workman-Davies Date Unknown 
http://www.labourguide.co.za/most-recent/1457-proposed-amendments-to-the-
labour-relations-act-and-the-basic-conditions-of-employment-
act?highlight=WyJ3b3JrcGxhY2UiXQ.  
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access common-law rights if the legislative protection is so limited. Is this not 
why section 77(3) of the BCEA and section 195 of the LRA have not been 
amended to date to exclude access to common-law claims? The suggestion 
that the legislative intention with the Chapter VIII provisions of the LRA was 
to provide new rights and remedies for especially vulnerable employees 
(without the intention to punish another class of employees by depriving them 
of existing (for example, common law) remedies) came to the fore in the 
majority judgment of Nugent JA in Fedlife. It also appeared in the majority 
judgment of van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and 
Security: 
[T]he LRA does not intend to destroy causes of action or remedies and section 
157 should not be interpreted to do so. Where a remedy lies in the High Court, 
section 157(2) cannot be read to mean that it no longer lies there and should 
not be read to mean as much. Where the judgment of Ngcobo J in Chirwa 
speaks of a court for labour and employment disputes, it refers to labour- and 
employment-related disputes for which the LRA creates specific remedies. It 
does not mean that all other remedies which might lie in other courts like the 
High Court and Equality Court, can no longer be adjudicated by those courts. If 
only the Labour Court could deal with disputes arising out of all employment 
relations, remedies would be wiped out, because the Labour Court (being a 
creature of statute with only selected remedies and powers) does not have the 
power to deal with the common law or other statutory remedies.58  
Many commentators have expressed reservations regarding the overlapping 
of jurisdiction of the labour courts and the civil courts, including fears of forum-
shopping and the development of parallel systems of law which would lack 
coherence and, in essence, destroy the fabric of labour law as a discrete field 
of law.59 These sentiments were echoed in Johnson and in McKenzie. 
But I believe that the legislature's establishment of a system of protection for 
vulnerable employees, which co-exists with the existing common-law regime 
(which is more accessible to non-vulnerable employees) is not necessarily a 
bad thing. This would simply imply that there is one system of law, but it 
caters, realistically, for differently-placed claimants by providing a system 
whereby claimants can pursue the most appropriate and effective remedy in 
the(ir) circumstances. Those persons who may enjoy the privileged position 
of being in an equal bargaining position with their employer must, in terms of 
pacta sunt servanda, be held to their contracts. As the Labour Appeal Court 
held in Vermooten v Department of Public Enterprises, "[w]here the parties 
are in a relatively equal bargaining position and consciously elect one 
                                            
58  Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) para 73. Emphasis 
added. 
59  See, for example, the discussion in Visser and Reid Private Law and Human Rights 
409-412. 
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contract or relationship over another, the legal effect should be given to their 
choice."60 Absent a sham relationship or the intention by the parties to act in 
fraudem legis, parties are free to contractually structure their relationship to 
exclude the application of the labour legislation. As also held in Vermooten, 
the parties may "consciously and deliberately [elect] to structure their 
relationship as one other than an employment relationship. It is permissible 
to do this."61 Is this stance by the LAC not consistent with an understanding 
of the protective scheme of the labour legislation being geared towards 
retaining the ability for parties who are suitably placed to elect to avoid the 
legislative scheme and rather float their boat on other grounds (for example, 
the common law of contract)? If one may validly contract out of the protection 
of the legislation, why should one be chastised for "forum-shopping" when 
electing to pursue (existing) common-law remedies in cases where the 
employment relationship has soured due to conduct by the employer? Is the 
McKenzie view of the universal and compulsory application of the statutory 
unfair dismissal scheme consistent with this? Does it give sufficient effect to 
pacta sunt servanda and the freedom of contract (which would include the 
freedom to choose the appropriate legal route to follow in order to pursue a 
breach of contract claim, if the claimant is suitably placed to have access to 
such remedies)? In the case of those employees and employers who may be 
on an equal footing in relation to bargaining power, does a system that 
restricts an employee (who may be able to pursue a large damages award) 
to a rather arbitrary, statutorily capped compensation claim not provide 
recalcitrant employers with a form of moral hazard – a safety net for unfair 
conduct that would otherwise be more realistically punishable? And is this 
view in line with the true intention of the legislature? 
A major problem, of course, is establishing what the true intention of the 
legislature is. I have made mention of the view expressed by various parties 
as to the need to promote the legislature's choice of establishing the labour 
forums under the LRA as the exclusive route for employment-related 
disputes; a "one-stop shop" for labour-specific dispute resolution and 
adjudication by labour law specialists.62 Ngcobo J, writing in Chirwa (in the 
context there of the dual causes of action relating to "LRA rights" on the one 
hand, and the claimed violation of constitutional rights on the other) was in 
support of this view, based on the primary objectives of the LRA: 
                                            
60  Vermooten v Department of Public Enterprises 2017 38 ILJ 607 (LAC) para 26 
(hereafter the Vermooten case). 
61  The Vermooten case para 25, with reference to Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God v Myeni 2015 9 BLLR 918 (LAC). Also see Benjamin 2004 ILJ 797. 
62  As per Skweyiya J in the Chirwa case para 47.  
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While section 157(2) remains on the statute book, it must be construed in the 
light of the primary objectives of the LRA. The first is to establish a 
comprehensive framework of law governing the labour and employment 
relations between employers and employees in all sectors. The other is the 
objective to establish the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court as superior 
courts, with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the LRA. In my 
view the only way to reconcile the provisions of section 157(2) and harmonise 
them with those of section 157(1) and the primary objects of the LRA, is to give 
section 157(2) a narrow meaning. The application of section 157(2) must be 
confined to those instances, if any, where a party relies directly on the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights. Where, as here, an employee alleges non-compliance with 
provisions of the LRA, the employee must seek the remedy in the LRA. The 
employee cannot, as the applicant seeks to do, avoid the dispute resolution 
mechanisms provided for in the LRA by alleging a violation of a constitutional 
right in the Bill of Rights. It could not have been the intention of the legislature 
to allow an employee to raise what is essentially a labour dispute under the LRA 
as a constitutional issue under the provisions of section 157(2). To hold 
otherwise would frustrate the primary objects of the LRA and permit an astute 
litigant to bypass the dispute resolution provisions of the LRA. This would 
inevitably give rise to forum shopping simply because it is convenient to do so 
or as the applicant alleges, convenient in this case "for practical considerations". 
What is in essence a labour dispute as envisaged in the LRA should not be 
labelled a violation of a constitutional right in the Bill of Rights simply because 
the issues raised could also support a conclusion that the conduct of the 
employer amounts to a violation of a right entrenched in the Constitution.63  
But apart from the objectives of the LRA mentioned there (listed in the 
Preamble to the Act as objectives number 6 and 7, respectively), what about 
the overarching objective of the Act – listed as objective number 1 – namely, 
to give effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices? If the intention 
of the legislature is to be distilled from the objectives of the legislation as 
reflecting the legislature's view on the required form of legislative protection, 
arising from negotiations between social partners in the process of the 
formulation of such legislation, then surely it is apt to ask whether those 
provisions of the legislation which have been interpreted by our courts as not 
standing in the way of the recognition of jurisdiction for the civil courts in 
respect of common-law claims (such as section 195 of the LRA and section 
77(3) of the BCEA) are not also reflective of a legislative intention which, 
primarily, is to give effect to the right to fair labour practices. And the best way 
to give full effect to such a right is to recognise a more robust scheme to bring 
employment-related claims, which scheme includes legislative respect for the 
continued recognition of pre-existing common-law rights. I believe this is what 
Van Niekerk J was implying in Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province: 
My conclusion that Chirwa does not have the effect of confining an employee 
only to the remedies provided by the LRA (thus precluding an employee from 
seeking to enforce any contractual remedy) does not fly in the face of the policy 
reasons that underpin the concern, expressed in the judgments of the majority 
                                            
63  Chirwa case paras 123-124. Emphasis added. 
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of the Constitutional Court in Chirwa, to protect the integrity of the system of 
conciliation, arbitration and adjudication within specialist structures, a system 
agreed to by the social partners, after a careful balancing of competing 
interests. The BCEA, enacted some two years after the LRA, is just as much 
the product of negotiation by the social partners, and the Act represents as 
much of a finely balanced compromise as the LRA. When the social partners 
agreed to the terms of section 77(3) of the BCEA, they acknowledged that 
disputes concerning contracts of employment had not been eclipsed by the 
LRA, and that this court ought appropriately to be conferred with powers to 
determine contractual disputes, concurrently with the civil courts.64 
Where legislation establishes a statutory scheme for claims which supersede 
the existing common-law scheme, it does so expressly. In the labour law 
context this is what the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA) does. Further afield, this is also what the Road 
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (RAF Act) does. These statutes take away a 
potential claimant's common-law rights and replace them with a statutory 
scheme and statutory compensation funds, and they do so expressly (and 
may do so by expressly reserving the retention of certain, specified claims 
under the common law (as in the RAF Act, section 21(2)). Which raises the 
question whether section 191 does this with unfair dismissals, by expressly 
or by necessary implication removing a potential claimant's common-law 
remedies for a breach of an employment contract. According to the majority 
of the court in Fedlife, this is not the case. And when one adds the legislative 
acknowledgement of a need to differentiate between vulnerable employees 
and high earners – with the apparent intended purpose of reserving the 
CCMA dispute resolution route for those most in need of its specific benefits 
(as is evident from the 2010 and 2012 amendment Bills referred to above) – 
it is submitted that there is little if any basis for implying that the Chapter VIII 
unfair dismissal scheme (and, specifically, the wording of section 191 LRA) 
excludes possible common-law claims, even in cases of (unfair) dismissal.  
Du Toit, it seems, would disagree in respect of the primacy of the protection 
of employees in the legislature's intentions behind the statutory scheme. He 
argues that Fedlife (and the other cases that have sanctioned the existence 
of a parallel common-law avenue for employment disputes) lost sight of (or 
simply ignored) the true purpose behind the legislation. He argues that 
modern labour law is no longer premised only on the protection of vulnerable 
employees against employers' exploitation of disparities in bargaining power, 
but that our labour law system is now aimed at protecting other, broader 
interests: 
                                            
64  Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province 2009 30 ILJ 605 (LC) para 25. 
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[T]he "purpose" set out in s 1 of the LRA is considerably broader than the 
traditional conception of the role of labour law. The central objective of the Act 
is encapsulated as "[advancing] economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratisation of the work-place", and the means of doing so 
is "by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act". The "primary objects", in turn, 
cover a wide spectrum of socio-economic activities, ranging from regulation of 
the right to fair labour practices (which applies to employers as well as 
employees) and giving effect to South Africa's obligations in terms of various 
conventions of the International Labour Organization to promoting the effective 
resolution of labour disputes. This multifaceted purpose is clearly far broader 
than the single objective of employee protection. It is, however, in line with the 
contemporary understanding of labour law as an aspect of labour market 
regulation in the widest sense. Given the challenges of pursuing socio-
economic development in an increasingly integrated world economy, policy-
makers are compelled to take a holistic view of the various inter-related 
processes on which such development depends, including the factors by which 
labour markets are determined. At the same time, South Africa's constitutional 
dispensation necessitates a rights based approach in pursuing these 
objectives; that is to say, the fundamental rights of all people, both as individuals 
and as social actors, need to be defined vis-à-vis one another and protected in 
the process. In adjudicating issues which impact on socio-economic 
development, it follows that courts need to be alive to the (often complex) 
purposes of the laws which they are interpreting.65  
Du Toit finds in this a basis for criticising the courts' fashioning of common-
law remedies which may allow parties to circumvent the statute. In effect, the 
argument seems to go, the courts are being criticised for elevating employee 
protection over other objectives of the legislature, including economic 
development, the promotion of social justice and the balancing of the 
interests of employers and employees. But, I would point out, eight years after 
Du Toit expressed these views the legislature has not stepped in to curb the 
development of this parallel common-law system for employment disputes 
(or, as the author calls it, a "parallel regime of judge-made employment law 
dictated by the vagaries of the cases that happen to come before courts and 
the views of the judges who happen to preside")66 – or, for that matter, to 
abolish the recognition of an implied common-law duty of fair dealing. One 
can surely infer from such legislative inaction a lack of a legislative intention 
to upset the applecart. If the judicial development of the common law in the 
cases referred to truly runs counter to the purpose of our labour law and the 
intention of the legislature, one would expect that the legislature would have 
acted, and acted decisively. But yet, we wait. 
                                            
65  Du Toit 2010 ILJ 39-40. 
66  Du Toit 2010 ILJ 42. 
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2.4 Another bite at the cherry? Employees double-dipping in the 
CCMA and the civil courts 
An argument sometimes raised by opponents of common-law claims for 
employment-related disputes (and which would apply also to claims based 
on a breach of the implied duty of fair dealing) is that employees should not 
be able to forum-shop in order to "double-dip" once a compensation award 
has been rendered by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) or the Labour Court. In essence, the spectre of uncapped 
potential breach of contract-based damages awards in addition to statutory 
compensation (along with the spectre of employers being faced, potentially, 
with protracted contractual claims which prescribe only after three years)67 is 
raised in defence of the purported exclusive nature of the legislative unfair 
dismissal scheme.  
But this argument lacks substance. It is a principle of the law of contractual 
damages that the calculation of damages in a breach of contract claim must 
proceed with caution in order to ensure that the plaintiff should not be over-
compensated. For example, where a plaintiff claims for damages in order to 
remedy the defendant's poor workmanship on the plaintiff's property (that is, 
damages to put the property in the state it ought to have been in) the plaintiff 
cannot at the same time refuse to pay the contract price for the work.68 In any 
claim before a court where the claimant has already been awarded 
compensation in the CCMA (and the defendant would invariably bring this to 
the court's attention) a court would be able to discount such an award in order 
to ensure that over-compensation by means of a damages award does not 
occur. There is little reason to fear that those who appear before the labour 
tribunals may have "a possible second bite in common law", as referred to in 
Johnson v Unisys.69 The courts retain their role of ensuring that a claimant 
receives neither more nor less than such damages that may be proven to 
have arisen from a defendant's breach of the contract (and the courts have 
gone to some lengths to explain that this is a painstaking process which 
should not involve conjecture and guesswork, especially where a damages 
claim includes damages for the prospective loss of future income).70 
Of course, damages awarded in a breach of contract claim differ from 
compensation awarded in an unfair dismissal or unfair labour practice claim. 
Compensation must be "just and equitable", according to section 194 of the 
                                            
67  Du Toit 2010 ILJ 25. 
68  Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract 658. 
69  Johnson v Unisys Ltd 2001 UKHL 13. 
70  See South African Football Association v Mangope 2013 34 ILJ 311 (LAC). 
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Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), and is in the form of a solatium in 
order to console the employee for the violation of a right, rather than 
compensation for quantified financial loss.71 An employee does not have to 
prove loss in order to be awarded statutory compensation, whilst loss must 
be proven in a breach of contract claim for damages.72 Damages for breach 
of contract are awarded for quantified patrimonial loss, and non-patrimonial 
loss cannot be recovered by means of a breach of contract claim.73 
Accordingly, awarding damages for a breach of contract after an earlier 
compensation award does not amount to "double-dipping". Just as Nugent 
JA held in Makhanya v University of Zululand74 that the defences of res 
iudicata and lis pendens cannot apply in respect of a common-law breach of 
contract claim on the one hand, and a claim based on "LRA rights" on the 
other (because these are different and separate causes of action), the relief 
claimed and/or awarded for these different claims in the relevant fora is also 
different. 
                                            
71  As it was explained by Waglay JP in ARB Electrical Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd v Hibbert 
2015 36 ILJ 2989 (LAC) paras 22-24: "The compensation that an employee, who has 
been unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair labour practice, may be awarded is not 
aimed at making good the patrimonial loss that s/he has suffered. The concept of loss 
or patrimonial loss may play a role to evince the impact of the wrong upon the 
employee and thus assists towards the determination of appropriate compensation, 
but compensation under the LRA is a statutory compensation and must not to be 
confused with a claim for damages under the common law, or a claim for breach of 
contract or a claim in delict. Hence, there is no need for an employee to prove any 
loss when seeking compensatory relief under the LRA. Compensatory relief in terms 
of the LRA is not strictly speaking a payment for the loss of a job or the unfair labour 
practice but in fact a monetary relief for the injured feeling and humiliation that the 
employee suffered at the hands of the employer. Put differently, it is a payment for the 
impairment of the employee's dignity. This monetary relief is referred to as a solatium 
and it constitutes a solace to provide satisfaction to an employee whose 
constitutionally protected right to fair labour practice has been violated. The solatium 
must be seen as a monetary offering or pacifier to satisfy the hurt feeling of the 
employee while at the same time penalising the employer … There are conflicting 
decisions regarding whether compensation should be analogous to compensation for 
a breach of contract or for a delictual claim. In my view, and as I said earlier, because 
compensation awarded constitutes a solatium for the humiliation that the employee 
has suffered at the hands of the employer and not strictly a payment for a wrongful 
dismissal, compensation awarded in unfair dismissal or unfair labour practice matters 
is more comparable to a delictual award for non-patrimonial loss. While a delictual 
action (ie action injuriarum) for non-patrimonial loss is fashioned as a claim for 
damages, it is no more than a claim for a solatium because it is not dependent upon 
patrimonial loss actually suffered by the claimant." 
72  KwaZulu-Natal Tourism Authority v Wasa 2016 37 ILJ 2581 (LAC) paras 32-33. 
73  Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A); Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and 
Reinecke Contract 401-402.  
74  Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 30 ILJ 1539 (SCA) (hereafter the Makhanya 
case). 
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2.5 A double-edged sword: The reciprocal nature of the implied duty 
of fair dealing 
A final reason for recognising the implied duty of fair dealing is that it would 
provide protection not only to employees but also to employers. While it is 
settled law that "everyone" enjoys the constitutional right to fair labour 
practice, and that this includes employers,75 it is also accepted that employers 
cannot bring unfair labour practice claims under the LRA against their 
employees.76 Whether employers may thus directly access the constitutional 
right seems to be an open question. The development of the common law to 
give effect to employers' right to fair labour practices in the absence of 
protection under the LRA would seem to be the appropriate basis for 
employers to access the right. And I would suggest that such constitutional 
development of the common law is already reflected in Murray's duty of fair 
dealing. 
While Cameron J's formulation of the implied duty in Murray focussed on the 
employer's duty towards its employees (in the context of the constructive 
dismissal claim at hand there), it is clear that this is a mutual duty resting on 
both employers and employees. This mutual duty constitutes the 
constitutional development of the existing common-law duty of trust and 
confidence as recognised in Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v 
Fijen and elsewhere.77 The mutuality of the application of the duty also 
reflects the relational nature of the employment contract (as well as "the 
constitutional values of reciprocal recognition of the dignity, freedom and 
equal worth of others, in [the case of a contract] those of the respective 
contracting parties.")78 Accordingly, employees must be taken to also have a 
duty to deal fairly with their employers, in the interests of the maintenance of 
the employment relationship. Part of this duty is reflected in the employee's 
common-law duty of good faith towards their employer. But it is suggested 
that the duty goes further than merely, for example, the requirement that the 
employee must refrain from misconduct. The duty of fair dealing should 
provide employers with additional recourse to breach of contract claims in the 
                                            
75  National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 
3 SA 1 (CC). 
76  National Entitled Workers Union v CCMA 2007 28 ILJ 1223 (LAC). 
77  As it was put in Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen 1996 17 ILJ 18 
(A) 20B-D: "[O]ur law is the same as that of English law, namely that in every contract 
of employment there is a duty that the employer will not, without reasonable and 
probable cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties ... A reciprocal 
duty also rests on the employee." 
78  As per Nkabinde J in Botha v Rich 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46 (hereafter the Botha 
case). See the discussion in section 4 below. 
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event that the employee acts unfairly towards the employer or the employer's 
interests. 
One example of how the duty of fair dealing could be utilised by an employer 
would be the scenario which presented in Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation 
Board79 (referred to earlier).80 The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) there found 
that an employer who purported to retrench an employee employed on a 
fixed-term contract had unfairly dismissed the employee, on the basis that 
the purported retrenchment constituted a breach of contract under the 
common law (in terms of which an employer could lawfully cancel the contract 
only if the contract made provision for this or if the employee had committed 
a material breach of the contract). The LAC's judgment in Buthelezi was 
rather strange. As mentioned earlier, Jafta J equated the unlawfulness of the 
employer's breach to unfairness, in finding an unfair dismissal, which is 
questionable. More fundamentally, it appears strange that the LAC, after the 
employee had chosen to assert its LRA rights by claiming relief for an unfair 
dismissal, decided the case on the basis of the common-law principles of 
breach of contract. The judgment has been criticised.81 However, my point is 
that Buthelezi's factual scenario provides an example of a situation where 
unfairness towards the employer could be addressed through recourse to the 
duty of fair dealing. In Buthelezi the employer had genuine operational 
reasons for the termination of the contract, which, in terms of the LRA, would 
point to the substantive fairness of the dismissal. However, the court elevated 
lawfulness over fairness (while also conflating lawfulness and fairness) to 
trump the employer's interests. Cohen explains: 
In the court's opinion the unlawful breach of the employment contract rendered 
the dismissal substantively unfair and the rights of the employer fairly to dismiss 
employees for operationally justifiable reasons were subjugated to the interests 
of sanctity of contract. By elevating considerations of lawfulness over fairness, 
an unfair distinction was made between fixed-term contract employees, who, in 
the court's view, could not be fairly retrenched during a fixed-term contract and 
indefinite period employees who face the prospect of fair and lawful dismissal if 
genuine operational requirements are found to exist. The court declined to 
develop the common law in accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution as, in 
the court's view, the common-law right to enforce a prematurely terminated 
fixed-term contract was not in conflict with the spirit, purpose and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. What the court failed to appreciate is that the right to sanctity of 
contract is not a constitutionally entrenched right but falls under the general 
protection afforded by the right to dignity, unlike the right to fair labour practices 
which unambiguously requires the fair treatment of both parties to the 
employment relationship. The employer's right to dismiss fairly for operational 
                                            
79  Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board 2004 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC) (hereafter the 
Buthelezi case). 
80  In section 2.3 in Part 3. 
81  See Du Toit 2008 SALJ 114-115; Cohen 2009 ILJ 2271. 
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requirements, which has been recognized and entrenched by the LRA, ought 
to have been factored into the court's assessment of the fairness of the 
premature termination. Had statutory and constitutional values been imported 
into the contract so as to protect both parties' rights to fair labour practices and 
fair dealing, as was successfully done in Gumbi, Murray and Mogothle, the 
courts would have been better equipped to assess the overall fairness of the 
dismissal in the light of the circumstances and effect of the breach.82 
While the court in Buthelezi should have considered the merits of the claim 
on the basis of what it was, an LRA claim, and held that genuine operational 
requirements would make the dismissal substantively fair irrespective of 
whether or not there may be a breach of contract under the common law, if 
the employee had instead brought such a breach of contract claim to the 
Labour Court or a civil court the employer should have been able to rely on 
the duty of fair dealing to deflect the claim. I would submit that it would be 
unfair to the employer to allow recourse for the employee in circumstances 
where the employer has acted fairly. After all, such fair conduct by the 
employer would have no implications under the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 for the employee's right to fair labour practices, nor 
under the LRA (whereby the existence of genuine operational requirements 
would make the dismissal substantively fair). 
The recognition of the reciprocal working of the duty of fair dealing would 
assist employers to enforce their right to fair labour practices. And it would be 
in line with Du Toit's call83 (above) for the courts to consider not only 
employee protection as the primary intention of the legislature in formulating 
the labour legislation, but also the broader objectives of the legislation, which 
include ensuring fairness for both employers and employees, the promotion 
of social justice, and the promotion of economic development. 
3 Developments regarding the appropriate role of good faith 
(and fairness) in the law of contract more generally 
The employment contract is a specific form of contract that has certain unique 
features that distinguish it from other commercial contracts. But it is a 
contract, and many rules and principles of the common law of contract are 
applicable to it. In this light and in the context of this piece, it remains to 
consider the potential impact of developments regarding the role of good faith 
and substantive fairness in broader contract law on the employment contract. 
I would suggest that not only is this a fruitful exercise because of the fact that 
the employment contract remains rooted in general contract law, but also 
                                            
82  Cohen 2009 ILJ 2289-2290. 
83  In section 2.3 in Part 3. 
AM LOUW PART 3 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  36 
because – I would submit – fairness plays an especially important role in 
labour law. Some may argue that this last is largely irrelevant, as the fairness 
mechanisms we see in labour law primarily derive from special legislative 
intervention rather than the common law regulating the contract. They may 
also argue that the common law of contract and labour legislation are two 
separate devices for the regulation of the employment relationship, although 
others would argue that in this context "contract and statute … have become 
inextricably intermingled",84 and "[c]ontractual rights operate alongside 
statutory rights as instruments for achieving the objects of the LRA".85 Be that 
as it may, I believe that fairness has a special role in the employment context 
not only because of the legislative intervention; our Bill of Rights demands 
that the parties to this relationship act fairly towards each other, as is evident 
from the guarantee of fair labour practices, which applies to both employees 
and employers. If most if not all conduct between the parties which occurs 
within this relationship constitutes "labour practices", then surely the contract 
which forms the port of entry into and the bedrock of this relationship should 
be characterised by fairness. While the courts have as yet been slow to 
import any meaningful role for fairness in the broader law of contract, courts 
should be more open to recognising a special role for fairness in the 
employment contract.86 
What is the current state of our common law of contract in respect of the role 
of fairness in the validity or enforcement of a contract or contractual 
provision? This may seem a simple question, but its answer necessitates a 
brief exposition of developments in the past twenty years or so. Much has 
been written by academics and other commentators on the role of substantive 
                                            
84  Du Toit 2008 SALJ 96. 
85  Du Toit 2008 SALJ 131. 
86  Pillay J, in Mohlaka v Minister of Finance 2009 30 ILJ 622 (LC) paras 32-33, hinted at 
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employment contract, especially where such developments are in line with the 
constitutional values and the purposes of the labour legislation which governs this 
relationship: "Not all contracts of employment favour employees. For many security 
guards, cleaners and other low-skilled employees, fixed-term contracts of short 
duration are their only means of being employed. Most low-skilled workers must want 
security of tenure. However, their circumstances force them to agree to short terms of 
employment or to face unemployment and poverty. The common-law test for duress 
is so high that such employees can seldom successfully avoid the limited duration 
clauses of their contracts to claim employment on indefinite terms. However, 
Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] 7 BCLR 691 (CC) kindles the debate about whether fixed-
term contracts of employment aimed at circumventing the LRA are consistent with 
constitutional values and whether upholding such contracts is compliant with ILO 
obligations ... This is a question for another time." On the influence of Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) (hereafter the Barkhuizen CC case) and the courts' stance 
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Cohen 2012 Acta Juridica 84.Also see Matlou 2016 SA Merc LJ 551-552.  
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equity in our law of contract, especially in the constitutional dispensation. 
Claims by proponents of a more robust role for equity into a system founded 
upon the principles of freedom of contract and of pacta sunt servanda have 
centred on specific areas in which the notion of fairness could evolve, 
particularly the role of good faith and public policy in contract law. All of this 
has been advanced in the light of the courts' constitutional duty to develop 
the common law in line with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
A starting point for the desired process of evolution is the role of good faith in 
contracts. Many have decried the Supreme Court of Appeal's apparently 
conservative stance on the role of good faith, as illustrated by a line of 
judgments where this court refrained from developing a role for good faith as 
a more independent or free-floating ground to challenge the validity of a 
contract or its enforcement. The view expressed in South African Forestry Co 
Ltd v York Timbers87 has been defended on a number of occasions by this 
court, relegating good faith to an underlying principle of our law of contract, 
which functions mainly in order to flesh out more concrete "black letter law" 
principles but falls short of providing direct recourse to a contracting parties 
who may claim unfairness or bad faith conduct by their contractual 
counterparts. Some commentators have preferred to find space for the 
development of the common law in the role of public policy in contract law,88 
and there is a hint of room for manoeuvre in this regard in the Constitutional 
Court's seminal judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier.89 Despite these calls for 
law reform, the SCA has stuck to its guns (which, one commentator believes, 
is reflective of a particular ideology which was given substance to in terms of 
a deliberate strategy of this court)90 throughout an increasingly long line of 
well-known cases, which include Brisley v Drotsky,91 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom,92 Napier v Barkhuizen,93 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd,94 Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties,95 and Potgieter v 
Potgieter.96 Detailed consideration of these judgments and the SCA's views 
as expressed there is beyond the scope of this piece, but it has been 
attempted elsewhere.97 I will focus, rather, on indications from the highest 
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court that the conceived notions of the role of good faith in contracts may 
require judicial intervention in terms of the development of the common law 
(which has come under fire by judges of the SCA, writing in their academic 
capacity).98 Barnard-Naude, in fact, believes the views expressed in the more 
recent Constitutional Court judgments are indicative of the emergence of 
good faith as the "master-signifier" of our law of contract (displacing freedom 
of contract and pacta sunt servanda from this role).99  
Again, detailed discussion of the relevant Constitutional Court judgments is 
beyond the scope of this piece, so I focus briefly only on the gist of the views 
on the role of good faith as expressed by Moseneke DCJ and Yacoob J (in 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd100) and 
Nkabinde J (in Botha v Rich). In Everfresh, which concerned a contractual 
agreement to negotiate the extension of a lease agreement, the appellant 
contended that the common law should be developed in terms of the 
Constitution to oblige parties who undertake to negotiate with each other to 
do so reasonably and in good faith. Yacoob J expressed the following views 
in his minority judgment regarding the role of good faith in our law of contract:  
Good faith is a matter of considerable importance in our contract law and the 
extent to which our courts enforce the good faith requirement in contract law is 
a matter of considerable public and constitutional importance. The question 
whether the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution require courts to 
encourage good faith in contractual dealings and whether our Constitution 
insists that good faith requirements are enforceable should be determined 
sooner rather than later. Many people enter into contracts daily and every 
contract has the potential not to be performed in good faith. The issue of good 
faith in contract touches the lives of many ordinary people in our country.101  
Yacoob J found the inspiration for these views on a robust role for good faith 
in the constitutional value system of Ubuntu: 
The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of ubuntu are also 
relevant in the process of determining the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution. The development of our economy and contract law has thus far 
predominantly been shaped by colonial legal tradition represented by English 
law, Roman law and Roman Dutch law. The common law of contract regulates 
the environment within which trade and commerce take place. Its development 
should take cognisance of the values of the vast majority of people who are now 
able to take part without hindrance in trade and commerce. And it may well be 
that the approach of the majority of people in our country place a higher value 
on negotiating in good faith than would otherwise have been the case. Contract 
law cannot confine itself to colonial legal tradition alone. It may be said that a 
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contract of lease between two business entities with limited liability does not 
implicate questions of ubuntu. This is, in my view, too narrow an approach. It is 
evident that contractual terms to negotiate are not entered into only between 
companies with limited liability. They are often entered into between individuals 
and often between poor, vulnerable people on one hand and powerful, well-
resourced companies on the other. The idea that people or entities can 
undertake to negotiate and then not do so because this attitude becomes 
convenient for some or other commercial reason, certainly implicates 
ubuntu.102 
Moseneke DCJ, in writing the majority judgment, appeared to concur 
(although this was obiter): 
Indeed, it is highly desirable and in fact necessary to infuse the law of contract 
with constitutional values, including values of ubuntu, which inspire much of our 
constitutional compact. On a number of occasions in the past this Court has had 
regard to the meaning and content of the concept of ubuntu. It emphasises the 
communal nature of society and carries in it the ideas of humaneness, social 
justice and fairness, and envelopes the key values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective 
unity. Were a court to entertain Everfresh's argument, the underlying notion of 
good faith in contract law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that agreements 
seriously entered into should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu, which 
inspires much of our constitutional compact, may tilt the argument in its favour. 
Contracting parties certainly need to relate to each other in good faith. Where 
there is a contractual obligation to negotiate, it would be hardly imaginable that 
our constitutional values would not require that the negotiation must be done 
reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement and in good faith. I however 
conclude that it is unnecessary to decide the merits of any of these difficult 
questions now.103  
Although these comments were made in the context of an agreement to 
negotiate (where good faith has a specific role to play),104 it is clear that the 
sentiments expressed probably have much broader implications for the role 
of good faith in contracts more generally. And Nkabinde J, in Botha, seemed 
to build on this new "ideology" on the role of good faith when she said the 
following (in the context of the application of section 27 of the Alienation of 
Land Act 68 of 1981, and the role of reciprocity between the contracting 
parties' obligations in the context of the provision): 
To the extent that the rigid application of the principle of reciprocity may in 
particular circumstances lead to injustice, our law of contract, based as it is on 
the principle of good faith, contains the necessary flexibility to ensure fairness. 
In Tuckers Land and Development Corporation it was pointed out that the 
concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness historically constituted good 
faith in contract. The principle of reciprocity originated in these notions. This 
accords with the requirements of good faith ... The Act seeks to ensure fairness 
between sellers and purchasers. Its provisions are in accordance with the 
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constitutional values of reciprocal recognition of the dignity, freedom and equal 
worth of others, in this case those of the respective contracting parties. The 
principle of reciprocity falls squarely within this understanding of good faith and 
freedom of contract, based on one's own dignity and freedom as well as respect 
for the dignity and freedom of others. Bilateral contracts are almost invariably 
cooperative ventures where two parties have reached a deal involving 
performances by each in order to benefit both. Honouring that contract cannot 
therefore be a matter of each side pursuing his or her own self-interest without 
regard to the other party's interests. Good faith is the lens through which we 
come to understand contracts in that way.105 
Some have criticised these rather loose and obiter remarks by Constitutional 
Court judges as creating uncertainty in our law of contract in the light of the 
established jurisprudence regarding the role of good faith, reasonableness 
and fairness in this context.106 Be that as it may, all indications are that our 
law of contract is poised for an overhaul in line with these sentiments (which, 
as observed, at least one commentator believes are indicative of a new 
ideology informing our contract law, emanating from the Constitutional 
Court),107 which would augur a greater role for good faith and a concomitant 
expansion of the scope for notions of substantive equity to be infused into 
private contracts. 
In this context it is my contention that these developments should spill over 
into the common-law employment contract. The employment contract is, after 
all, a contract. Those who may view the exclusive role for fairness in this 
context as provided for by the supplementary provisions of labour legislation 
which imports notions of fairness into the employment relationship would be 
well advised to consider that this would reflect a rather paternalistic view 
which would undervalue the role of the parties and the emerging conception 
of mutual duties to respect the dignity and interests of the respective parties 
in our constitutional milieu. No longer can the parties' bargain be described 
simply as grounded in a regulatory regime (the common law) which concerns 
itself only, or predominantly, with lawfulness as opposed to fairness (as 
alluded to in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt).108 An understanding of the 
constitutionally developed common law as providing a scheme whereby the 
autonomy of the parties to the employment contract is fettered not only from 
"the outside" (by labour legislation) but is also circumscribed from within by 
the common law – shaped by constitutional values – would be more in line 
with the spirit of the Bill of Rights. And the views expressed by the 
Constitutional Court judges in the cases referred to above are eminently 
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relevant and surely especially applicable to such a fundamentally relational 
contract as the employment contract.109 When one considers the extremely 
apt basis for such a recognition for the role of fairness (and good faith) as is 
provided by the common-law duty of trust and confidence – and its 
development to provide for a duty of fair dealing as per Murray – the 
employment contract may provide the ideal vehicle for achieving the vision of 
those proponents of a constitutionally transformed law of contract which 
worships at the altar of the principles of Ubuntu and of the "politics of 
friendship"110 in private contracts. The employment contract, as developed to 
the point recognised in Murray, may in fact be a poster child for the ideal that 
the constitutionally transformed (or transforming) law of contract is striving 
towards, which would be the achievement of the recognition of mutual respect 
and co-operative conduct in contracting, subject to an objective, ethical 
standard of fair dealing that is rooted in the boni mores and reflective of our 
constitutional values.111 It seems rather ironic that the SCA, which has been 
so lambasted by contract law scholars for its conservative stance in 
developing the role of good faith and substantive equity in contract law, is the 
very court that has come out much more forcefully in promoting access to 
contractual remedies relating to fairness in the employment contract (in cases 
such as Fedlife, Old Mutual Life Assurance Co. SA Ltd v Gumbi,112 Boxer 
Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya,113 and Murray v Minister of Defence,114 and 
culminating, of course, in Murray). This may be due to the fact that its 
judgments have been informed by the specific fundamental right to fair labour 
practices which applies to the employment relationship, while in contract law 
cases there is no constitutional right (or value) of fairness more generally. Be 
that as it may, at the very least I do not believe that the employment contract 
can be immune from the broader developments regarding fairness in our law 
of contract,115 and I can find nothing in the currently ongoing development of 
our general law of contract that would gainsay the recognition of an implied 
duty of fair dealing in the employment contract.  
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4 Conclusion 
In this piece I have argued for the (continued) recognition of an implied 
common-law duty of fair dealing in the employment contract. The grounds for 
such recognition can be summarised as follows: 
- Our courts recognise, and have for some time recognised, that the 
common-law employment contract contains an implied duty of trust and 
confidence. Bearing in mind the relational nature of the employment 
contract, as well as developments in the law of contract more generally, 
this duty is in line with the constitutional notion of a contract as imposing 
mutual duties of respect on contracting parties. It is in line with the 
constitutional value system, which embraces Ubuntu. 
- In Murray the SCA unequivocally stated that the implied duty of trust 
and confidence must be considered to have been developed, in line with 
the constitutional guarantee of fair labour practices, to constitute an 
implied duty of fair dealing in all employment contracts. 
- In SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie116 the SCA purported to 
backtrack on Murray by holding that the common-law employment 
contract does not contain an implied term to the effect that an employer 
will not unfairly dismiss an employee. However, McKenzie failed to 
overturn Murray for a number of reasons. The first reason is that the 
ratio of McKenzie was different from that of Murray, in that the claimed 
basis for the implied term differed significantly in these two cases. In 
Murray the source of the implied duty of fair dealing was the sec. 23 
right to fair labour practices. In McKenzie the claimed source of the 
implied term not to be unfairly dismissed was the legislative unfair 
dismissal scheme contained in Chapter VIII of the LRA. The second 
reason is that Wallis AJA in McKenzie appeared to misconstrue the 
clear wording of Cameron JA's judgment in Murray, and dismissed the 
clear ratio of the latter case without proper consideration of its 
implications. The third reason is that, even if McKenzie did have the 
effect of backtracking on Murray, it did so only to a limited extent, by 
creating a "McKenzie exclusion zone" to Murray's implied duty of fair 
dealing, by excluding dismissals from its purview and by retaining a 
general duty of fair dealing relating to employer conduct short of 
dismissal. But this, I have argued, is untenable, as it would have the 
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paradoxical effect of allowing employers to forum-shop in a manner that 
would be detrimental to the employee's job security, would not be 
conducive to the maintenance of employment relationships, and would 
thwart the intention of the legislature in giving effect to the right to fair 
labour practices through the means of protective labour legislation. 
- The argument that dismissals should be excluded from the application 
of a duty of fair dealing, and that any dispute about the unlawfulness of 
a dismissal would invariably involve a claimed unfair dismissal and 
would have to be decided in terms of the legislative unfair dismissal 
scheme is also not convincing. It is wrong to automatically equate 
unlawfulness with unfairness, and attempts to do so would fly in the face 
of Makhanya's warning that claims should not be mischaracterised in 
order to change the nature of the claim and exclude it from the purview 
of the civil courts (and both Makhanya's and Fedlife's recognition that 
the civil courts retain their jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims 
if the lawfulness of a dismissal is being challenged). 
- The argument against employees being afforded the opportunity to 
"double-dip" by claiming both compensation from both the CCMA or the 
Labour Court and also claiming contractual damages for breach of 
contract does not hold water. It ignores the fact that the relief sought is 
different (contractual damages for proven patrimonial loss, as opposed 
to legislatively-mandated compensation as a solatium), and also 
ignores the fact that courts are duty-bound in awarding contractual 
damages to ensure that a claimant is not over-compensated for the 
other party's breach of contract.  
- It is also questionable whether the frequent calls based upon legislative 
policy considerations to exclude from the civil courts breach of contract 
claims relating to dismissal, in order to give effect to and promote the 
legislative unfair dismissal dispute resolution scheme as a specialist 
scheme are convincing. The legislature has failed to address the 
purported problem through the amendment of the relevant legislative 
provisions, which clearly evinces that there is no legislative intention to 
outlaw recourse to the civil courts in breach of contract claims relating 
to an employment contract. Also, our courts have to date not dealt 
sufficiently with the question of the actual legislative intent behind the 
establishment of the LRA's unfair dismissal scheme, and it is apparent 
that the scheme was set in place in order to protect vulnerable 
employees without any apparent intention to take away pre-existing 
rights from less vulnerable employees. 
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Accordingly, the implied duty of fair dealing still exists in the common-law 
employment contract. And there are good reasons for its continued 
recognition: 
- While some may argue that Murray's constitutional development of the 
common law was unnecessary in respect of employment relationships 
covered by the LRA, it is questionable whether the LRA in every case 
sufficiently gives effect to claimants' right to fair labour practices. Some 
employees slip through the cracks, and examples of these were 
discussed above. In these cases, there is a clear role for a 
constitutionally developed common law which can act as a backstop 
and provide a cause of action based on fairness, in line with the 
legislature's intention to infuse the employment relationship with 
fairness. And the courts are constitutionally obliged to develop the 
common law in this respect where the legislation fails to give sufficient 
effect to a claimant's right to fair labour practices (or other constitutional 
rights). 
- But such a role for the implied duty of fair dealing is not limited only to 
the exceptional cases of employees who may find themselves 
insufficiently protected by the legislation. The implied duty should be 
recognised as applying to all employment contracts. 
- The argument against the recognition of such an implied duty of fair 
dealing as allowing claimants to circumvent the specialist labour dispute 
resolution forums and thereby making a nonsense of the policy 
considerations behind the legislative unfair labour practice and unfair 
dismissal scheme is not convincing. Having examined the apparent 
legislative intention behind the legislative scheme, it emerges that it is 
possible to discern legislative recognition of the differences between 
vulnerable and less vulnerable employees, and to assert that the 
legislative intention behind the LRA employee protection scheme was 
primarily to provide protection for vulnerable employees who may lack 
access to common-law claims. Furthermore, there is no clear sign in the 
legislation of a legislative intention to deprive employees of pre-existing 
common-law rights (in fact, the obverse seems to be the case), and 
Fedlife and Makhanya have confirmed the continued availability of 
common-law causes of action in the employment context. In fact, this 
was endorsed by the majority of the court (by way of van der 
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Westhuizen J) in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security.117 Also, the 
legislature has to date steadfastly failed to address criticisms against 
forum-shopping in employment disputes by amending provisions such 
as sec. 195 of the LRA and sec. 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA). This would be very surprising, 
following the judicial views on this issue expressed in cases such as 
Chirwa v Transnet118 and Gcaba, if one were to assume, without more, 
that the legislature shares such views. 
The current position is that the SCA in Murray recognised that all employment 
contracts are subject to an implied common-law duty of fair dealing. This 
recognition has been criticised by some and supported by others. It may very 
well be that Cameron JA in that case would have been well-advised to 
elaborate on various aspects of such a duty (such as its exact scope), and 
that Murray constitutes a "big bang judgment"119 which can lead to 
uncertainty in the law. What I should like to see is for the debate to resume, 
and for the courts to view themselves not only as being bound by Murray 
(until it is overturned by the LAC or the Constitutional Court) but also as being 
duty-bound to flesh out the exact application and scope of its duty of fair 
                                            
117  Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) para 73 (hereafter the 
Gcaba case), where he observed as follows: "[T]he LRA does not intend to destroy 
causes of action or remedies and section 157 should not be interpreted to do so. 
Where a remedy lies in the High Court, section 157(2) cannot be read to mean that it 
no longer lies there and should not be read to mean as much. Where the judgment of 
Ngcobo J in Chirwa speaks of a court for labour and employment disputes, it refers to 
labour- and employment-related disputes for which the LRA creates specific remedies. 
It does not mean that all other remedies which might lie in other courts like the High 
Court and Equality Court, can no longer be adjudicated by those courts. If only the 
Labour Court could deal with disputes arising out of all employment relations, 
remedies would be wiped out, because the Labour Court (being a creature of statute 
with only selected remedies and powers) does not have the power to deal with the 
common law or other statutory remedies." 
118  Chirwa v Transnet 2008 4 SA 367 (CC). 
119  As Benjamin 2009 ILL 762 remarks: "[I]n Bato Star Judge O' Regan warns that "the 
extent to which the common law remains relevant to administrative review will have to 
be developed on a case-by-case basis as the courts interpret and apply the provisions 
of PAJA and the Constitution." A "case-by-case" approach would have led the court in 
Murray to fashion relief for an employee unprotected by labour legislation. Instead, the 
court articulates a new principle applicable to all employees. One of the reasons for 
advocating a "case-by-case" approach is the uncertainty caused by "big bang" 
judgments [such as Murray] ... How wide is the "a duty of fair dealing at all times" it 
establishes? The judgment gives no answer, presumably because it was not 
necessary to grapple with these issues to grant Murray relief. Employers find 
themselves in much the same position as they did after 1979 when the Industrial 
Conciliation Act was amended to establish an industrial court with wide powers to 
determine unfair labour practices. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the first 
beneficiaries of the trilogy are employer labour lawyers whose clients are anxiously 
seeking their advice as to whether particular decisions that they are making or have 
made may violate the duty of fair dealing." 
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dealing. In this way we will have a system of labour law which reflects the 
central importance of fairness in both its legislation and its common law. And 
while the consequences of this – including the perceived anomalous situation 
of the co-existence of concurrent legislative and common-law remedies for 
unfair dismissal, which so upset members of the House of Lords in the UK 
(and some commentators closer to home) – might worry some, I would 
suggest that such anomalies may be a necessary extension of our unique, 
constitutionally-entrenched right to fair labour practices. This right, or rather 
its interpretation by our courts, seems to be evolving and expanding, and this 
I believe is of extreme importance in considering both the development of the 
common law and the role of the legislature in giving effect to the right. Du Toit 
observed the following in respect of the fact that the LRA's failure to cover all 
potential unfair labour practices in its definition of the concept does not mean 
that the statute is unconstitutional: 
Where the LRA (or any other statute) fails to provide a means of enforcing a 
constitutional right, the common law should be applied or developed to do so; 
and, if this cannot be done, the constitutional right may be relied upon directly. 
'Constitutional scrutiny' therefore does not necessarily mean that a provision of 
the LRA which fails to give effect to the right to fair labour practices in all its 
aspects in any given context is per se invalid. Rather, it may reveal a hiatus 
which can be remedied by developing the common law or relying on the 
constitutional right itself.120 
And the Constitutional Court, in a recent judgment which called for an 
expansive understanding of the application of and recourse to the section 23 
right, seemed to indicate a greater potential role for the common law as well 
as the possibility of greater access to direct recourse to the right: 
The principle of subsidiarity was recently considered by this Court in My Vote 
Counts. Neither the majority nor minority judgments in that case are directly on 
point because the issue involved a provision of the Constitution that required 
Parliament to act. Section 23(1) lacks that requirement. A decision by 
Parliament not to cover the entire field would not fail to fulfil a duty in the 
Constitution. A fair labour practice claimant may be entitled to rely on the 
Constitution directly without having to show that the LRA (or patchwork of other 
statutes) is deficient.121 
Accordingly, the legislature is not viewed as the exclusive purveyor of fair 
labour practice protection, and claimants may be given greater direct access 
to the constitutional right in those cases where the legislature has failed to 
act. Does this not also foreshadow the common law's playing in future a more 
robust role in the pursuit of giving effect to the right to fair labour practices? 
                                            
120  Du Toit 2008 SALJ 104. 
121  Per Froneman J in Pretorius v Transnet Pension Fund (CC) unreported case number 
CCT95/17 of 25 April 2018 para 51. 
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After all, as observed in the dictum quoted above, the fact that section 23(1) 
does not expressly call on the legislature to act must be read along with the 
express duty placed on the courts, in section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights, to 
develop the common law – in this case in order to give effect to the right to 
fair labour practices through the recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing. 
The opponents of the development of the common law to import fairness into 
employment relations are to my mind devaluing the role of the common law 
as part of the Constitution's single system of law. This may be due to modern 
labour lawyers' having a distrust of the archaic common law as opposed to 
the (possibly "less woolly") modern, post-constitutional labour legislation. But 
this might ignore the fact that "the common law is not what it used to be" and 
has been (and is being) substantially re-shaped with the infusion of 
constitutional principles by judges engaged, quite rightly and legitimately, in 
"constitution-making".122 In the process of such devaluation, it might also 
offend against the principle of the separation of powers by establishing a 
hierarchy within which the legislature is elevated above the judiciary in setting 
the tone for the shape that constitutionally-mandated fairness will have in 
employment relations in future.   
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